By A.J.R.Groom, University of Kent
It all depends upon which end of the telescope you are looking through, and indeed, whether or not you have put it to your blind eye. In short, the question of whether International Relations (IR) is still an American Social Science, as Stanley Hoffman once so famously asserted (Hoffman 1977), may evoke a very different response depending on the end of the telescope and the positioning of that instrument in relation to the blind eye. From the heartland of American neo-realism, neo-institutionalism or social constructivism IR may seem to be an American Social Science, particularly if that eye can see no further than the boundaries of North America. Seen, however, from the confines of the contemporary EU, nothing fundamental would be lost if North American IR were simply to shut up shop. Everything that is of merit in North American IR, and there is much of very great merit in quality and impressive quantity, can be found in EU IR, and more besides. Moreover, there is little difference in quality, although the quantity may be significantly less. Excellence and dross can be found everywhere.
Indeed as IR re-establishes itself in a liberal academic form in most of Central and Eastern Europe, we move into the historic heartland of another intellectual tradition in IR – the fructuous intellectual breeding ground of Marxist-Leninist approaches. There are other added strengths in diversity in the shape of the legal approach in France and Mediterranean Europe, a long tradition of administrative science, in additional to a glorious background in conceptualised area studies, begotten by empire, however dubiously. More recently an indigenous German tradition has reasserted itself with great strength in philosophy and sociological approaches to IR together with a long-standing Scandinavian penchant for this genre of research.. To be provocative, if forced in a Darwinian selection to choose, it might be better to preserve European IR rather than North American IR on grounds of comparable quality but greater diversity. Such a question, however, denies the complex interdependencies of an intellectual world that is in many ways one and which has had, in the past, its centres and its peripheries. It still does and they demonstrate that IR was never an American Social Science: it remains a unity in diversity even if it is still depressingly and parochially Western.
Contemporary post-modern approaches and methodological debates aside, it is not difficult to conceive of IR intellectual history in terms of three traditions. Among the great names of European Political Thought we can cite Hobbes, Grotius, and Kant, as symbolising these three general approaches (Bull 1977). After the Second World War Martin Wight characterised them as realists, rationalists and revolutionists (Wight 1991). More recently, a similar categorisation has been made between realist, pluralist or world society approaches, and structuralists (Banks 1985), acknowledging thereby inter alia the Marxist tradition. This overall conceptual framework has proved useful as a guide, and it owes little to North American IR.
The disciplinary background of the founding professors of International Relations was predominantly international law in the United States and diplomatic history in the UK. On the continent both traditions prevailed, but with a predominance for law. The founding professors inherited from the nineteenth century the three intellectual traditions with the balance of power, as institutionalised in the Congress and Concert System illustrating the realist approach. The growth of liberal internationalism, and particularly the activities of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors as well as the attempts at creating systems of arbitration and arms control in the second part of the nineteenth century, exemplified the pluralist approach. Structuralist approaches could be found in the newly-founded traditions of Marxism and geopolitics. The influence of North America in these developments was significant, but certainly not hegemonic.
In the nineteenth century the United States government ostensibly kept clear of the machinations of the European great Powers, although it acted in a realist manner in the Americas and Pacific – not to forget the Barbary Coast. As the bourgeois liberal reformists began to exert their influence there was a strong American participation in the meetings of concerned individuals and private societies. Yet there was, in the Americas, little on the scale of the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross or of the Anti-Slave Trade Movement. However, there was a major contribution in the area of arbitration and the growth of mediation as a means of managing disputes. The Alabama Case between Britain and the United States is a case in point. Moreover, there was a growing willingness to accept legal obligations to submit to arbitration in the Americas which was also a tribute to this pluralist Liberal Internationalist approach. In addition, there was a considerable and important literature on integration theory as the states of the USA sought to come together, fell apart in the Civil War and then built a new integrated community over the decades out of its smouldering embers (which have still not been finally extinguished). There are striking parallels between the American debates and issues and those around the current European Convention. Integration theory has long been and remains an American forte. On the other hand, in the structuralist revolutionary framework there is little to be found. Nevertheless, the writings of Admiral Mahan on the use of sea power by the British and earlier by the Romans had significant influence of the continent, especially in Germany, and gave credence to a different form of structuralism – geopolitics (Mahan 1965). But the greatest influence of the United States came later. It was in the philosophy and political drive to establish the League of Nations on the foundation of collective security and also in the major role played by the United States in an important thrust for arms control as exemplified by the Washington Naval Treaty. Here, indeed, the United States had a leading role and somewhat reluctant followers. This was something that was meat and drink to a country which had built itself from a group of not always co-operating colonies to be the dominating Power on a continent and, on the basis of that experience, now proposed to create a new world order. The apogee of this approach of social engineering and institution building, based on the tenets of liberal internationalism, gave rise to the founding of International Relations as a discipline, both in the United States and the UK and it was the foundation of the first consensus in the field.
It has long been a matter of pride for Welsh, that the first Chair in International Relations in a modern university system was that funded by Lord David Davies at Aberystwyth in the University of Wales as the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics [2]. In the aftermath of the First World War a number of Chairs were founded in Britain, notably at Oxford and LSE, as well as at Aberystwyth. Chatham House, later to become the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was established as a link between the academic world and that of government in pursuit of the ‘scientific study’ of what was, and still remains, part of the agenda of the day, namely, the understanding of the causes of war and the conditions for a stable, enduring and self-sustaining peace. In the United States Chairs were also founded and the sister institute of Chatham House was the Council on Foreign Relations.
Although much of the energy that lead to the founding of these Chairs and to the idea of progressive rationalism and social engineering had been shared widely in the continent, particularly in France, the Low Countries, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, International Relations as a formal discipline did not flourish, except in Geneva where the Graduate Institute of International Studies was founded in 1927. The institute received a considerable sum of foundation money from the United States, although its Directors were from France and Switzerland. It quickly became a haven for refugees from fascism in all branches of international studies including history, politics, economics, and law. The rise of fascism as a dominant political doctrine in Europe put liberal internationalism very much on the defensive, apart from France, Britain, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and parts of Scandinavia. Elsewhere all branches of political science, and not least International Relations, were stifled except where they were used as a prop for expansionist and racist theories, as in the use of geopolitics by the Munich School led by Haushofer to support Hitler’s policies of, Lebensraum, Drang Nach Osten and racism. Britain and the United States benefited immensely from the intellectual plight and physical flight of scholars such as Georg Schwarzenberger and Hans Morgenthau (Schwarzenberger 1964; Morgenthau 1985), who together with E.H. Carr (Carr 1981) were the intellectual pivots of the second consensus in International Relations on realism.
The rise of fascism, theories of Social Darwinism, the depression, the Second World War, and the Cold War created a climate in which liberal internationalism was found wanting. The dark tenets of a Hobbesian world of anarchy, self-help in a security dilemma and the drive to dominate came to blinker intellectual life. It was not that such phenomena did not exist – they did, and in plenitude – but that other phenomena were ignored. The pendulum, as perhaps in the 1920s, had once again swung too far. What cannot, however, be gainsaid, is that realist International Relations was now overwhelmingly dominant in the United States and the subject was essentially American-based in terms of the sheer size, and often the quality, of the work produced. Moreover, as the subject spread, it spread as the American science of International Relations, whether in Africa, India or elsewhere in the English speaking world. On the continent the Germans were re-learning their Political Science and International Relations from the Americans, while in many other countries IR had retreated into the rather arid framework of Faculties of Law. Some notable figures joined the American debate, such as Raymond Aron (Aron, 1967), and while there were some in Britain, such as Martin Wight, who had a wider view imbued with Christianity, or who were diplomatic historians of an old school (Butterfield & Wight 1966, Hinsley 1963), their influence was nevertheless slight and the debate was truly an American debate, (albeit often fired by European immigrants). But this did not last for long. Moreover, there was much going on in areas not then normally conceived as IR insofar as Britain and the United States were concerned. This was especially marked in area studies in the tiers-monde of a sociological or anthropological nature. This was particularly the case in France, hence the coining of the French phrase and its adoption in English.
The challenges to realism were not long in coming. Because they were for the most part grounded outside the United States, their success in establishing other points of view in effect undermined the hegemony of the American discipline of IR. John Burton, David Mitrany, Karl Deutsch and James Rosenau (Burton 1968, 1972; Mitrany 1966, 1975; Deutsch 1963, 1966; Rosenau 1967, 1969) developed transnationalist ideas in different but related ways. In France, Marcel Merle moved in the same direction (Merle 88). Pluralist approaches were back and Burton and Mitrany were based in Britain, although neither was British. Deutsch moved between the old and new worlds, and Rosenau was a powerful indigenous, but somewhat lonely voice, in the American academic establishment. The realist approach engendered a practical and theoretical response in the form of non-alignment under the intellectual authority of writers such as Leo Mates and A.P. Rana (Mates 1972; Rana 1979). Structural theories came back into fashion, emanating initially from Latin America and gradually spread in the tiers-monde, as well as being adopted in the developed world. An initial impulse came from the work of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America under the direction of Raoul Prebisch. Ironically, rather as Marx and Lenin had predicted, the road to the citadels of capitalism, or rather its intellectual fortresses, was through the tiers-monde. Although eventually some leading scholars in the United States did embrace this approach, it was only after currency had been given to the ideas elsewhere.
A further challenge to realism came from historical sociology. Leading figures in this area operated on both sides of the Atlantic, such as the British writer Michael Mann (Mann 1986, 1993). Mann agreed that there has never been an holistic ‘international’ society at any point in human history since, while the four bases of social power – economic, political, military and ideology – interact and interpenetrate they never congeal into a coherent whole. Moreover, the political–military factors do not necessarily predominate as realists would have it. Indeed, for the last 500 years capitalism has dominated and it is now being challenged by ideology in a religious form whether in the mountains of Central Asia or the backwoods of the Southern United States. Taking their lead from Braudel (Braudel 1972) a group of American scholars associated with Wallerstein (Wallersatein 1979) developed centre-periphery models with a deep historical richness and developed long-cycle theories (Modelski 1987). The former were imbued with Marxist traditions and the latter put a new and attenuating gloss on realism.
Curiously, one area in which the challenge to realism was strongest was in fact dominated, at times almost exclusively, by scholars from the United States namely in the development of integration theory. Although the phenomenon was European, it posed a major anomaly for realist theory. The intellectual lead in broaching this new phenomenon was essentially American, as the impact of the likes of Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg attests (Haas 1964; Lindberg 1963). Nevertheless, on the whole what we can discern is that the cutting edge of International Relations in the 1960s and later was not only in the United States but also elsewhere, and notably, beyond the confines of the developed world. If there had been an American social science of International Relations, it was a short lived phenomenon.
What of the present situation? The high priests of both post-modernism and critical theory, such as Foucault and Habermas (Foucault 1968; Habermas 1972), are not American, but those who have developed their ideas in the context of International Relations are mainly Anglo-Americans (Brown 1994). Even if we accept the point that the Enlightenment project has its epistemological weaknesses, then we might as well shut up shop if we have nothing to replace it with or if we are not prepared to make the best of what we think we have for the time being. Manifestly, to shut up shop on social science goes somewhat against the grain of human history and the seeming motivation of human beings. One way or another, we seem to want and need ‘to know’, however imperfectly.
Critical theory helps us to come to terms with this since its manifest aim is liberation, but within a context. It abjures us to be aware of and not to take our intersubjectivities too seriously, but it does not deny foundations, nor does it deconstruct into dusty rubble. Rather, it simply warns us that we are only working with the best intersubjectivity currently available for whatever we are interested in – and that we had better not get too ambitious about our ‘findings’. Methodology has from time to time engendered a debate in IR. That concerning behaviouralism is a case in point where a strong positivistic school held court in the United States (Singer 1968), but received a stringing if not always fair rebuff in Britain (Bull 1969). Nevertheless positivism does have powerful if rather lonely advocates in British IR (Nicholson 1983) and in the peace research communities in Germany and Scandinavia. As we have seen the European balance was more towards crucial theory rather than anti-foundationalism à l’outrance. Critical theory is an attitude of mind that is running strong but which only makes sense in the context of praxis and in a spirit of transformation.
On the continent, while critical theory has its place, and indeed a strong place, in the UK there are two developments one of which clearly derives its impetus from continental thought but not from continental IR. Rather it has a philosophical and sociological geneses, mainly from French thought, and concerns itself with discourse analysis and deconstruction as a method (Jabri 1996; George 1994). To be sure this is also evident in the United States but if the programmes of BISA and ISA are compared it is evident why American scholars in this genre felt particularly at home in the British context. The same can be said of international political thought and particularly its concern with ethics and human rights (Frost 1986). On the other hand, in feminist approaches to IR, the balance is the other way with the focus more on the United States, with Britain in the middle and the Continent somewhat on the periphery (Sylvester 1992). There is, if anything, a more activist stream in North American feminist writing and a greater philosophical bent writing in Europe, even by resident Americans.
Perhaps the most exciting current development in IR is the growing loss of Western provincialism. IR started off as a bourgeois Western European and North American enterprise. As an Anglo-American phenomenon it initially eschewed structural approaches until they were forced on it through centre-periphery and historical-sociological analyses often, but not always tinged with a Marxist flavour. Even non-alignment often seemed merely to be realism from a different place in the structure. This provincialism is at long last beginning to change.
Over the last few years Western scholars, and in particular those in Britain, have begun to explore the IR literature in non-European cultures and in particular in China, Japan and the Arab world. They have made a sharp differentiation between what was essentially Western cloning by local scholars – often to good effect – and an analysis of political thought organic to the indigenous political culture. (Chan 2001; Jones 2003). This opens the way to an IR that is more than Western. It is not that there were no studies of such thought and philosophy, but in the past these did not penetrate the closed Western world of IR. Ironically, at the same time as there is an opening in Europe to a world beyond the West, American IR seems to be closing in upon itself reading fewer non-American authors and being concerned with its debates on neo-realism, neo-institutionalism and social constructivism, in which others join to be sure, but which nevertheless seem to have much of a muchness as an academic profession is embroiled in its turf wars. IR is, surely, more than that which is why the legacies of Japan and China are so fascinating and the promise is of more to come from India, the Islamic world and, who knows, perhaps Africa. This linkage to the non-Western world comes through philosophy and it is of the greater interest to international political theory in Europe, especially Britain, that acts as a bridge to other worlds. Americans in their philosophical work seem to be mesmerised by the clash of civilisation rather than learn from a different attempt to understand our human condition. (Huntingdon 1993).
If we consider some of the principal sub-fields of IR at the present time we can see that there is an healthy mix of leading figures from the United States and elsewhere. In normative theory the thrust is as much in Britain as in the United States but, somewhat strangely, there appears not to be a strong interest on the continent. In international organisation there is a clear division between the Anglo-Americans and the continental legal tradition, with scholars such as Marie-Claude Smouts (Smouts 1995) bridging the divide. International organisation is now enjoying a modest revival in its traditional institutional sense because such institutions are fora through which important political and socio-economic questions are raised and programmes pass. In the UN system peacekeeping and peace-building are major endeavours, while in the EU there is an innovative process of building up, building down, building across and building beyond, thus creating a zone of peace on the former cockpit of world war. But beyond this are the questions of globalisation, global problems and global governance which excite scholars beyond the confines of Europe and North America.
Conflict research, on the other hand, has had a very strong impulse from Europe, notably in Scandinavia where Johan Galtung was one of the founding fathers. Galtung, an highly prolific writer was also instrumental in launching the influential Journal of Peace Research. In the Netherlands the Groningen School had an early contribution while in Germany there has been a long-standing important contribution of the Hessen Institute. In France Gaston Bouthoul (Bouthoul 1962) had a different, highly positivistic approach while in Britain a group lead by John Burton (Burton 1969) was highly innovative in both theory and practice. IPE has a long history in Britain, which has provided its Mother Superior, Susan Strange (Strange 1988), while the fundamental contribution of the Latin Americans has already been mentioned. It is thus a general pursuit with no particular location.
Strategic Studies were for long an Anglo-American preserve with important contributions, but of a like ilk, from Britain and Australia. Although there was a major imbalance in quantity between Britain and the United States and American guru’s such as Brodie and Schelling held great sway in policy fields (Brodie 1946; Schelling 1960), nevertheless the early debate on massive retaliation, graduated deterrence and arms control was significantly influenced by the formulations of Slessor, Buzzard and Bull (Slessor 1954; Buzzard 1956; Bull 1961) and the (International) Institute for Strategic Studies proved a forum for much seminal thought. Most of this was predicated upon the Cold War and for a while Strategic Studies was adrift following the end of the Cold War until it began to reformulate around wider nations of human security, environmental security and the like. Those strategists who felt uneasy or even lost in this new setting now have their manna from heaven in the form of terrorism and US imperialism through preventive war. A different voice was heard from France, where one can conjure up names such as Gallois, Beaufre and, in a different context, Regis Debray (Gallois 1961; Beaufre 1965; Debray 1967).
While political geography has been kept alive by the French as much as anyone, it too is now flourishing including its post-modern wing . Yet nowhere have its implications been fully integrated into mainstream IR except perhaps in geostrategic and geoeconomic aspects as, for example, in American strategic thought and military expansion and the development of the EU, particularly the French ‘widening’ of the Rhine Valley though the TGV network.. Foreign Policy Analysis, on the other hand, is very nearly a North American phenomenon. There are, of course some distinguished exceptions in Europe such as Walter Carlsnaes (Carlsnaes 1986), but European IR does not seem to take decision-making models, psychological theories and the like to heart in the sense of an indigenous European contribution. Instead those in the field in Europe play the American game again with the exception of some younger scholars such as Frédéric Charillon (Charillon 2002). Harold and Margaret Sprout deserve our thanks for keeping the ecological aspects of human affairs on the agenda (Sprout 1965), but environmental politics is well established in universities in Europe, as well as in practice through Green parties. Students on both sides of the Atlantic not only study such issues but act upon them.
A great deal of the work of continental scholars is only known in Britain and the United States if it is translated into English. Thereby hangs a structural difficulty since it is likely that the work of continental scholars will be translated only if it concerns the central debates of the English speaking world, either conceptually, methodologically, or in terms of substantive issue. It is thus by extension part of the American science of International Relations, and to a lesser extent the British variant. We pick up, and in this instance, translate, that which we know, and we know that which we understand, or which is taken back to Europe from North America by graduate students and visiting lecturers. What we miss all too often is that which is hard to find because we do not know what we are looking for. But is there something there? We know that there is a legal tradition in the study of International Relations in much of continental Europe, and indeed, Latin America. We know that there is a tradition of public administration studies and we also know that there is a rich tradition of area studies in the research institutes of the old imperial Powers of Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Where then are we in Europe now?
International Relations has had a critical mass in IR in Britain since the mid-1960s with the expansion of the University system at that time. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s there were only nine full Professors in the subject. However, the subject was already being organised professionally through BISA which now has a membership of 950. This should, however, be seen in the context of ISA (3300), JAIR (2100) and KISA (2500). The establishment of the ECPR Standing Group for International Relations in the late 1980s and the pan European Conferences beginning in 1992, together with the EJIR, has given meaningful expression to a European dimension together with other sub-European regional associations such as NISA and CEEISA and IR sections of national associations, e.g. AFSP. In total the European IR community is both numerous, diverse and lively although not as well-organised or interpreted as that in the United States. In France (Groom 2002), Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Austria and Switzerland a national critical mass has been reached and it is gaining strength in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. In Eastern Europe IR is weak, as is political science generally in that part of the continent, but the CEEISA and the Russian ISA are very promising developments catering to a burgeoning post-Cold War academic generation. The past problem of a lack of institutionalisation, in the sense that International Relations was part of a broad Political Science Faculty or a Law Faculty with no professional associations, is now being overcome. Moreover, there is a growth in new professional IR journals in different languages in Europe which go beyond policy analysis. In short, the North American ISA now has some interlocuteurs valables.
During the past decade there has been a change in the location of training of young European scholars in IR. Whereas the traditional pattern of studying abroad in the United States, France, Britain and Russia continues, it does so to a lesser extent since as the subject develops, albeit unevenly, the possibilities for high level training in local universities and research institutes has increased. Thus there is no particular pattern, and it is not necessary to go abroad to study to make a successful career in IR, This is one of the manifestations of the weakening or decline of North American hegemony in the field. A North American, French, British or Russian period of postgraduate training is no longer a rite de passage. While it is true that many continental scholars now write in English, they do it, not so much as to break into the Anglo-American debate, although this is a factor, but because English has become the lingua franca of social science. Indeed, much postgraduate teaching and training, as well as research, takes place in English in continental universities and research institutes. In a sense too, money talks, in that foundations may be more likely to give funding for a research project in English than one in another language, further exacerbating the paradox of the overwhelming predominance of the English language in a discipline which lays claims to a global vision. In some senses the use of English destroys the nuance of thought of non-native speakers and often leads to a loss of subtlety and insight. Because it imposes upon them the structures and thought patterns of a different culture, many feel that they cannot give the best of themselves in English. The point is that it is a matter of professional responsibility for scholars in a discipline such as International Relations to be aware of contributions from colleagues in other parts of the world. Happily the exploration of non-Western thought relevant for IR is a new and helpfully countervailing trend.
We return to our starting point. What hegemony? There have always been differences of intellectual tradition, method and of agenda. However, even at the height of American political domination in the formative years of the Cold War there was a plurality in IR. In the Western world there was an independent Francophone tradition and in the East there was an official Marxist one. Since then the devastation of German Political Science by the Nazis and its subsequent revival, together with a strong Scandinavian input, has revived a third tradition. Now as we look to Asia, there is greater diversity, but we are still blessed with strong means of communication and understanding. What is exciting is that polarisation and isolation seem to be breaking down.. There is now an European IR community which is alive and well and living, for the most part, in the EU. It has the advantage of easy access to the glories of North American academia, but at the same time it can dig deeply into its own national intellectual traditions conceived within a broader European framework. The Europeanisation of IR is a notion whose time has come, and it interacts on a somewhat separate, but largely equal basis, with North American IR. There are no hegemonies, and this may also be true beyond the confines of the EU and North America. It is in both our interests to explore whether this is the case. After all the sun does rise in the East.
Canterbury, April 2003.
Notes
[1] This article draws substantially in parts upon an earlier essay by A.J.R. Groom and Peter Mandaville: ‘Hegemony and Autonomy in IR’ in Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis (eds): IR: Still an American Social Science? Albany, SUNY Press, 2001. I am grateful to a number of colleagues for their views and advice on subsequent developments.
[2] We should note that an important precursor was Emily Greene Balch who taught courses in international politics and economics at Wellesley College in the United States from 1896 to 1918. Dismissed from her post at Wellesley on account of her pacifism, Balch went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 for her work with the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. I am indebted to Craig Murphy for bringing this to my attention.
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