Social Facts in World Politics – The Value-Added of Constructivism

By Antje Wiener

Abstract

The paper assesses the value-added of the constructivist turn. To that end, it cuts down on jargon, stressing style and substance of constructivist debates instead. It is argued that two observations make such an assessment particularly valuable to students of international relations. First, a considerable confusion persists about what constructivists do. Second, the contribution of constructivists often remains hidden within a thicket of constructivist work. The paper proposes to conceptualize the constructivist turn as a frame through which conversations about how to study the role of social facts in world politics have become possible. According to a scheme which presents conversations among constructivists at ’stations on a bridge’ between rationalist and reflective poles, different approaches to this problem are recalled. The paper finds that the major challenge for constructivists remains exploring the dual quality of norms as regulative or constitutive on the one hand, and constructed through interaction, on the other.

1 Introduction

Since the 1990s an increasing resort to the language of constructivism in international relations theories (IR) and, relatedly albeit more recently, in research on European integration (EI) has been noted. So much so, that constructivism has turned into a buzzword and the notion of a “constructivist turn”[1][2] in world politics is now widely accepted within the community of IR scholars and beyond. Next to rationalism constructivism now provides the  major point of contestation for international relations scholarship.[2][3] After territorial paradigm battles and little agreement on where to look and which questions to ask in world politics, constructivists have began to “establish” the middle-ground, cutting a “via media” through the third debate[3][4] between the mutually exclusive paradigmatic positions of the so-labeled rationalists and reflectivists. The popularity of constructivism as a new label has now spread from the area of world politics to the fields of comparative politics and European integration. The interest in the use of this label raises questions about what constitutes the attractiveness of constructivism as an approach, and as a set of moves in the social sciences.[4][5] The following three questions summarize this query:

-    First, the most encompassing question of what is the value-added of constructivism?

-    Second, what is the role of constructivism within the trajectory of debates in IR, that is, what are constitutive elements of the constructivist turn?

-    Third, the arguably most basic question of what are the research tools promoted by and applied in constructivist research?

These questions are more about what constructivists do, what is the stuff this turn has produced, than why they do it. The elaboration on answers to them will therefore be based on the constitutive elements of style and substance that discussed by constructivists and, much less, the sequencing of theoretical approaches. To that end, the paper addresses the questions in their turn. It begins with the observation that, apart from the constructivist focus on middle-range theorizing and the role of social facts in world politics, an inquiry about the core of constructivist approaches will inevitably provoke more agreement about questions than answers.[5][6] This holds true for debates among constructivists themselves as well as for debates among rationalists and constructivists. Emanuel Adler’s observation that “there is very little clarity and even less consensus as to its [constructivism's; author] nature and substance,”[6][7] appears to be still valid to date. In other words, while the call for debate about theorizing the middle-ground is generally welcomed,[7][8] and “[p]erhaps the most common interpretation of the dispute between rationalists and constructivists is that it is about ontology, about what kind of ’stuff’ the international system is made of,” how the world “hangs together,”[8][9] a suspicion about the advantage of the diverse set of analytical tools brought to the fore by constructivists remains none the less. Can the argument then be sustained that “the debates within constructivism itself as to ‘what constructivism is really about’ … have tended to obscure constructivism’s scientific basis”?[9][10] And if so, so what? Does the scientific basis always matter significantly say, for example, to studies of constitutional change in ‘complex-state’ settings, or norm-implementation in world politics?

The paper cautions against the notion of the constructivist project,[10][11] which is often tagged on to the presentation of a constructivist-rationalist debate, since it implies agreement among constructivists about one particular project and conversation among two parties. Constructivists pursue their respective research projects which do at times, but not necessarily, overlap. To avoid generalization and exclusion which is often, but not necessarily the result of such positioning, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the attractiveness of the constructivist turn lies precisely in the conversations among various constructivist positions. These conversations occur among constructivists and their critics (rationalists and reflectivists) at a number of what I call ’stations on the bridge’ (Section 5). At the stations a specific shared analytical focus/problem is discussed, often with reference to the neighboring stations. They are the stuff of what is often referred to as bridge-building by constructivists.  However, the end and start-point of the bridge as well as the bridge itself have rarely been identified in detail.[11][12] While some see a gap between constructivists and rationalists, others see constructivism itself as “an attempt [...] to build a bridge between the widely separated positivist/materialist and idealist/interpretive philosophies of social science.”[12][13]

This interest in bridge-building does not follow logically from the experience of debating within a long-time hostile IR community (see Section 3). And, indeed, there are those who are opposed to ‘friendly debates’ and evoke the tradition of ‘fault-line politics’ in IR instead.[13][14] This said, the frequent reference to bridging as a key property of constructivism is significant, none the less. It requires further scrutiny. To that end, the paper highlights the variety of constructivist positions and research interests. The primary task of the following sections is there fore to explore the role of constructivism as a set of moves within a particular environment and as voicing a distinct – if variegated – message. The focus is on interaction (communication) among constructivists to assess the style (constructivist strategies and positioning) and the substance (analytical innovation) produced by constructivist debates. This approach finds that what matters most to the constructivist turn is debate. Accordingly, the value-added is approached through three goals. First, the paper explains the attraction of the constructivist turn based on the review of style (Section 3) as well as of substance (Section 4). Based on this review it proceeds to offer a scheme of constructivist positions as stations on a bridge between rationalists and reflectivists, and a summary of the value-added of constructivism (Section 5). Finally, it points out analytical avenues which require further precision, flagging, in particular, the quality of norms as a core element in the process of conceptualizing the social (Section 6). The following develops the argument (Section 2).

 

2 Shared Interest, Different Avenues

2.1 Shared Interests: Social Facts

The key common assumption of constructivists is to bring in the social to an under-socialized discipline. Taking this perspective seriously and bringing it to bear in empirical research poses the challenge of developing a robust analytical approach to the “intersubjective dimension of human action” in politics as a key element in (world) politics.[14][15] While the majority of constructivists would find themselves in agreement about stressing an interest in discussing issues of ontology (what things are made of) over epistemological debates (what questions should we ask) as a logical consequence of the notion of socially constituted facts,[15][16] the operationalization of the social in applied research differs widely and significantly among constructivists.[16][17] In other words, the common concern with the notion of “constituted social facts” and a shared interest in the “constitutive role of ideational factors”[17][18] has not prevented the participants of the debate to pursue different avenues in theory and research. According to the thrust of this paper’s argument difference is fruitful because it raises awareness about analytical shortcomings and sharpens the respective analytical perspectives. It is part and parcel of constructivist middle-range theorizing. To assess the value of variation, difference therefore needs to be identified, placed and evaluated.

This paper assumes, that analytical scrutiny is gained through communication.[18][19] This view attributes a strong emphasis on the role of communication in the form of—not necessarily but possibly—controversial arguments about the respective approaches and preferred analytical tools. The paper endorses a Habermasian understanding of constructive debate in which all participants are open to persuasion on the one hand, while they are also searching for indicators of common rules of behavior, on the other.[19][20] A framework which enables communication therefore crucial to the constructivist turn. The type of framework, the context of the debate, is taken as the starting point for an assessment of the value-added which is developed in three steps.

The first step situates constructivism within the environment of the discipline of international relations as a context which has traditionally generated a culture of debates.[20][21] The second step recalls and restates the key questions raised by early constructivist moves about the input of social facts in the material world of IR theories and follows the, somewhat belated, responses to these key theoretical issues raised in the 1980s by the different responses to the challenge provoked by these questions about the emergence and impact of social facts. The third step offers a contextualized and somewhat more detailed characterization of constructivist properties as a culturally path-dependent as well as a contingent process that has helped to substantiate the tool-kit for the analysis of social facts in world politics. Expressed analytically, these steps indicate that causal and constitutive questions need be addressed according to time (why did the interest in constructivism increase in the 1990s?) as well as shared interests (how is it possible that constructivism brings together scholars from such a broad range of intellectual backgrounds?).

 

2.2 Different Avenues

The paper argues that the shared constructivist language by scholars from backgrounds as diverse as, say, neofunctionalism, the ‘English School’, the ‘Frankfurt School’ and the ‘Stanford School’[21][22] requires explanation for two reasons. First, the research tools and conceptual assumptions of the scholars affiliated with the various approaches differ to the point of being mutually exclusive. Secondly, the context of IR has been forged by a culture of debates which have reached a high point of non-communication, disinterest and misunderstanding with the “third debate.”[22][23] Why and how did constructivism, then, manage to bring scholars back to sit at one table?[23][24] To answer this question, this paper turns to the concept of frames[24][25] and proposes to explore the constructivist turn as a set of moves in IR which are set in the larger context of the social sciences nonetheless.[25][26] This said, it is important to note that constructivism is neither a product of the IR community, nor are its origins dated found in the 1990s. Yet, the fact that constructivism has gathered steam and influence towards a constructivist turn  in IR since the 1990s is a puzzle which requires further explanation.

In sum, the paper asks how was it possible for constructivists to change the theme of the debate in the discipline in such a significant way, and what came out of it? For an answer it turns to the method of constitutive explanation,[26][27] proceeding in two steps. The first step identifies the constitutive aspects of this development. Secondly, it seeks to explain why constructivism—and not, for example, reflectivism or rationalism[27][28]—became the stuff of the fourth debate in IR. The explanation draws on the sociological concept of framing which assumes that frames are constructed to provide actors with a codified reference to a set of complex issues (Snow and Benford 1992). The following introduces the concept of framing as a helpful methodology for an assessment of the constructivist turn.[28][29]

 

2.3 Framing Debates

The concept of frames has been successfully applied by social movement theorists, and more recently, in studies of European integration.[29][30] Students of social movements have been intrigued by the ebb and flow of protest mobilization. How could variation in social mobilization be explained? In search of an answer, social movement scholars have raised two questions. First, “what accounts for the temporal clustering of SMOs and activities, and second, what accounts for the cyclicity of social movement activity?”[30][31] As Snow and Benford demonstrate, the concept of a shared frame of reference offers key information about the motivation to act. A ‘frame’ is defined as “an interpretative schemata [sic] that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment.”[31][32]

These frames help individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ events.”[32][33] Their main role lies in focusing and punctuating, as well as in the attribution of blame and the articulation of a number of events into a simpler code. It is interesting to note that the key to frames is not necessarily based on changes of capabilities such as, for example, bringing in new ideas. Thus, “what gives a collective action frame its novelty is not so much its innovative ideational elements as the manner in which activists articulate or tie them together.”[33][34] The main function of a frame can then be summarized as offering a different way of putting things together. A frame allows actors to present issues to a group of recipients in a particular way. It hence offers space for strategic moves, while its successful application is dependent on the institutional and social contexts as well. For example, while lobbying has been a central strategy of US American non-governmental organizations, its use in western European politics has taking a different route.[34][35] The definition of a collective action frame suggests that its main role is to communicate a particular understanding of a particular setting to particular addressees.

            With a view to the debating culture in IR the concept of framing is thus used to understand how the emerging and dying debates—in particular, the emergence of the constructivist debate—fit into the development of the discipline. According to this approach the specific elements of a debate matter less than the way the debate is presented within the discipline.[35][36] The research is based on communications among constructivists and their critics about the respective research goals and the published presentation of the results of these debates. The paper argues that the most attractive feature of constructivism is not an agreement about the specific meaning of constructivism as a research program, as a (meta-)theory, or a new method, but the notion of the constructivist turn as a frame to facilitate communication. Taking this observation as a starting point for the purpose of explaining the emergence and impact of the constructivist turn in IR, and eventually in EI as well, means asking the question of how did constructivism acquire the role of a frame? What were the strategic actions, structural opportunities and constraints that brought this development about?

To elaborate on these questions, the paper turns to the culture of debates in IR. I argue that the four main theoretical debates present a series of theoretical (and political)[36][37] moves within the discipline. These moves have been facilitated by a number of factors including changes in the wider world political and the narrower disciplinary context as well as according to interests of the social scientists involved in the debate. It is striking to observe the changes of style and substance of debate. For example, while the first three debates were largely led in a little interactive manner with the third debate leaving people on less than speaking terms barely bothering to read what the other camp produced.[37][38] The current fourth debate is, surprisingly and distinctively, characterized by verbal interaction among an increasing number of interested parties. Different from the previous debates, it has even found to be “stimulating.”[38][39] Why this shift?

In sum, despite a flourishing debate among constructivists and their critics (see Section 5, Figure 3) there is little agreement and, indeed precision, as to what exactly constructivist methodologies, approaches and analytical tools are. Subsequently, to lookers-on constructivism often presents a certain appeal while remaining “somewhat vague”[39][40] in terms of its operationalization in applied research. If it is true that theoretical rigor is found to be wanting, what does make this approach such an attractive one? As a response to these points, this paper’s chosen task is to explore the methodological and analytical value-added of constructivism along the two dimensions of style and substance. The style-dimension entails the role of constructivism in the field of IR as a set of moves which facilitated communication about the challenge of theorizing social facts in world politics. The substance-dimension reflects analytical propositions to conceptualize and operationalize research about interaction as the outcome of these communications and flags avenues for further research. The following section focuses on the style-dimension, Section 4 turns to the substance-dimension.

 

3 The Debating Culture: Changing Styles of Communication

This section assesses the impact of constructivism as a master frame in the social sciences and as a collective action frame in IR. It argues that the attraction of the constructivist turn is based on its role as a frame through which multilateral theoretical debates about the constitution of social facts and their impact on world politics[40][41] has become possible. The section demonstrates that, as a frame, constructivism has facilitated communication about issues and among scholars who, in the absence of such a frame, would not have been likely to interact. The concept of framing thus facilitates an understanding of the variation in the pattern of debates. The section first summarizes different debating styles. Second, it moves on to the constructivist turn as a distinct move that introduced a new style of communication. The following Section 4 identifies the theoretical moves that contributed to shape the constructivist turn as a frame for increased communication about shared theoretical challenges in post cold war world politics.

 

3.1 Four Debates

A brief summary of what have come to be characterized as the four major debates in IR[41][42] will provide the context for contextualizing the constructivist turn (see Table 1). The first debate included the opposing positions of realists who believed in the key role of individual interests in power and hence stressed the continuous risk of war, on the one hand, and the idealist belief in the impact institutions could play with a view to establishing and maintaining peace in international relations.[42][43] The contents of this debate was largely identified with hindsight, once it became obvious, after WWII that the idealists’ hopes grounded in the League of Nation’s power to prevent war, did not materialize. The opposing realist and idealist positions, stressing the impact of human interest in power, and the capability of institutions to interfere with the anarchic structure of the state system, respectively, were hence sharpened in a debate which was shaped in the postwar era. The context was one of war and peace, the theoretical interests were set on how to prevent war, and maintain peaceful relations within a hostile world, the approaches were in the area of international law and organization, on the one hand, and in the diplomatic history of events, on the other.

The second debate introduced a focus on theoretical approaches to international relations, including traditionalist vs. behavioralist positions. Compared to the first debate which involved (former) politicians and diplomats, in particular, the second debate was about academic approaches to international relations. This debate was about the general theoretical thrust of IR and how the more historical traditional approaches could be improved by resorting to more ’scientific’ methods and assumptions which were key to the wider social sciences in the context of the postwar era. More specifically, this debate engaged different point of views about IR as a discipline bringing in behavioralist methods as opposed to the more historical approaches that had guided the traditional study of diplomatic history in  world politics until then. This debate also introduced the focus on epistemology, with the opposing positions of positivistic epistemology of behavioralists and the historical approach of the traditionalists.[43][44] The former making the stance for nomothetic approaches to world politics that were able to link particularity with generalization whereas the latter argued in favor of ideographic approaches that focus on history as the substance of theory.[44][45]

 

(Table 1 about here)

The third debate took the second debate over how to best study world politics, i.e. which one is the best approach, further to the point of a battle over paradigms. While the opposing positions were forcefully defended, this debate included little interaction among the opponents as such. It did, however, generate mass participation within the confines of two camps which came to be labeled the “rationalists” and the “reflectivists.”[45][46] Each of the two camps finally settled at the poles of a straight line, leaving the participants with a shared interest in producing the best paradigm and little in common about how to get there. The third debate thus produced a situation where communication within the discipline was at an all time low. The emphasis was on epistemological differences, i.e. what questions should be asked, or how do we know? Within the framework of the third debate constructivists were often distinguished from “rationalists” or “positivists” by labeling them as “reflectivists” or “post-positivists.”[46][47] As Alexander Wendt summarizes correctly,

“[I]n this ‘Third Debate’ the field has polarized into two main camps: (1) a majority who think science is an epistemically privileged discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer understanding of the world, and (2) a large minority who do not recognize a privileged epistemic status for science in explaining the world out there. The former have become known as ‘positivists’ and the latter as ‘post-positivists’, …  it might be better to call them ‘naturalists’ and ‘anti-naturalists,’ or advocates of ‘Explanation’ and ‘Understanding’ respectively. In any case, the two sides are barely on speaking terms today, and seem to see little point in changing this situation.”

           

And Ole Wæver points out in his seminal review of the debating culture in IR what is now perceived as a debate, had in fact little to do with a practice of interaction (see Table 1).[47][48] Third debaters kept with binary positioning as the dominant disciplinary practice in the 1980s. This style reflected in many ways the context and discourse of cold war world politics, on the one hand, and key structuring practices of modern philosophy that have been identified by feminist and cultural studies critics, in particular.[48][49]

In turn, the fourth debate has moved on from this incommunicado situation, developing an interactive style of communication in the process. The focus of the fourth debaters was on the shared interest in the ontological question of what do we see, and how do we study it? It assembled a range of approaches to middle-range theorizing based on neo-institutionalism, game theoretic approaches, and sociological approaches, more generally. The key aspect was the question of how to theorize the impact of social facts on world politics. In the following, the following section explores the shift from this incommunicado to a (potentially) ‘all-communicado’ situation in the fourth debate.

 

3.2 The Constructivist Turn

In the early 1990s it became obvious that the pure rationalist and/or reflectivist positions singled out by Robert Keohane in a seminal key-note address at the 1988 American Political Science Association meetings were not sufficient to explain or understand world politics. In particular, the growing and decisive impact of the cultural environment including such social facts as (human) rights norms, identity-options, speech-acts, changing negotiating practices, responsibilities and promises raised the question about how to account appropriately for such heretofore neglected social factors in world politics, and how to relate them to the familiar aspects of material resources, power constellations and guiding principles. Furthermore, the end of the cold war had furthered globalization and with it the establishment of governance beyond the state. It raised questions about responsibility, accountability, legitimacy and democracy, in a word, about civil dimensions within the realm of world politics which had been governed by international law. Institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have contributed to changes in constitutional structures and practices of governance inside as well as outside domestic political contexts. These changes reiterate the importance of social interaction and the impact of this interaction on change in world politics. They hence bring the questions of intersubjectivity, norms and behavior back to the fore. Different from the 1980s, the disciplinary context is now no longer framed by the third debate’s paradigm competition. Instead the communicative frame of the constructivist turn offers a medium to sharpen the tools with which to assess the meaning of social facts.

Given the dramatic change of context in world politics, the fourth debate was framed in a particular way. If it can be maintained that “[m]aster frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories. [....] master frames can be construed as functioning in a manner analogous to linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns of happenings in the world,”[49][50] the constructivist turn offers something akin to a master frame. For example, at the time of the constructivist turn in IR in the 1990s, constructivist thought had been widely discussed within the social sciences and the humanities in general, i.e. in the disciplines of sociology, education, philosophy and psychology. As a master frame this context provided reference to meta-theories as well as to constructivist methods. By drawing on these issues in various ways which were mainly exploratory at first, constructivists in IR shaped the constructivist turn as collective action frame which provided reference to these specific questions.

The frame has not been generated entirely from a purely research generated perspective, or for that matter, from a problem-oriented perspective. Beyond such empirical points of departure, it has been constructed with the intention of creating new research programs, or projects, as well. Such strategic disciplinary moves have been found within US American political science in particular. An example for such a move which contributed to forge the framing of constructivism in IR and generate a major push was a research program that was developed under the lead of Peter Katzenstein at Cornell University, and discussed in collaboration with John Meyer and associates at Stanford University.[50][51] According to the model of framing cyclic moves, the success of this push can be referred to three major resources that were available at the time. First, as a result of the third debate, the research program was able to draw on scholarship which had developed an extensive and profound critical scrutiny of the positivist approaches in IR.[51][52] Second, it was able to draw on theoretical innovation from outside IR, expanding on the well advanced scholarship of neoinstitutionalists not only in IR but also and at that time, particularly, in sociology.[52][53] Third, the involved scholars were able to draw on material resources that are necessary to develop the research program within the wider IR community, and subsequently apply the approach to a relatively large number of empirical studies.

This strategic move represents but one insight into how actors combined social and material resources and thus contributed to shaping the constructivist turn as a frame. Another example is offered by studies on the social construction of state sovereignty which also seek to explicitly explore the promise of constructivism based on a shared research program, and which concludes from a number of studies that the result of such research can be summarized as “to question understandings of the sovereign territorial state by questioning each of its components – territory, population, authority, and recognition – and the practices that constitute, delineate, and organize each of these components individually and collectively.”[53][54] Other examples of collective contributions to the constructivist turn did not as explicitly set out to establish a research program. However, their contribution to the constructivist turn has been significant and innovative none the less. They include research on the impact of human rights norms generated by a group around Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink.[54][55]

Contributions within the larger field of more individual perspectives on constructivist approaches have more recently been sorted along the lines of specific research questions or particular research areas such as, for example, compliance, conflict resolution, enlargement of international organizations and European integration. They were discussed at workshops and conferences and subsequently often published in edited volumes.[55][56] Finally, a notable example of the constructivist frame’s impact on creating a particular opportunity structure is the attempt to reconstruct the so-called English School as constructivist from hindsight.[56][57] These developments demonstrate the type of input and output, i.e. the way in which resources are used to create a frame, even though this process has not been defined as framing by the participating actors, and how the frame impacts on expanding the interest in this frame. That is they are the basis of the process of shaping and making the constructivist turn. With a view to assessing the methodological value-added, the paper now turns to elaborate more explicitly on the development of the substance of the constructivist turn.

 

4 The Substance of the Constructivist Turn

If not an elaborated and commonly applied research program, the constructivist turn has facilitated a frame of reference for a growing number of scholars. The key shared view is “that Neorealism and Neoliberalism are ‘undersocialized’ in the sense that they pay insufficient attention to the ways in which the actors in world politics are socially constructed. This common thread has enabled a three-cornered debate with Neorealists and Neoliberals to emerge.”[57][58] The debating culture thus set the context for the constructivist turn and the clout it has come to develop. The theoretical disagreement among third debaters pushed the key conceptual concern that came to be the launching point for constructivists to the fore. Subsequently, two theoretical moves brought the issues on the table on the middle-ground. The following recalls these conceptual and methodological queries that preceded the constructivist turn, and hence formed key substantive resources which were, in fact, dusted-off later when the constructivist frame had acquired some stability in the discipline.

 

4.1 Epistemological Queries

The first move was epistemological. It highlighted the role of intersubjectivity in regime analysis. A key theoretical problem had been identified in a seminal article by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie as the problematic contradiction between the choice of a (positivist) epistemology and the ontological focus on norms they found to be immanent to regime theory.[58][59] They argued that unless the social ontology of norms was theoretically addressed, regime analysis would continuously face this problem.[59][60] The problem consisted in a mismatch of the concept of regime as entailing converging expectations on principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a given area of IR,[60][61] on the one hand, and an epistemological framework that assumed actors’ self-interests as endogenous, on the other. If the perception of shared norms was conditional for regime analysis, how could an individualist analytical framework facilitate an understanding of intersubjectivity? It was pointed out that the neo/realist approach was not fit to conceptualize intersubjectivity and could ergo could not adequately assess the role of regimes. The theoretical challenge was summarized thus:

“In many [...] puzzling instances, actor behavior has failed adequately to convey intersubjective meaning. And intersubjective meaning, in turn, seems to have had considerable influence on actor behavior. It is precisely this factor that limits the practical utility of the otherwise fascinating insights into the collaborative potential of rational egoists which are derived from laboratory or game-theoretic situations. To put the problem in its simplest terms: in the simulated world, actors cannot communicate and engage in behavior; they are condemned to communicate through behavior. In the real world, the situation of course differs fundamentally.”[61][62]

            Apart from the choice of denying the problematic aspect of this situation altogether, two solutions were on offer. One option was to adopt an intersubjective ontology that would be compatible with a positivist epistemology, The other was to open epistemology towards more interpretative strains. At the time, the last option appeared preferable.[62][63] However, the constructivist turn and ensuing debates in the 1990s demonstrated that the first option had not been dismissed altogether. Indeed, whether or not foreseen by the authors of these queries, the preference to combine a positivist position with an intersubjective ontology has become widely shared among the majority of constructivists who engaged in the fourth debate.

 

4.2 The Ontological Move and Ensuing Constructivist Debates

The second move was ontological.[63][64] It suggested that while the structural power of anarchy was key to state interests, it was not exclusively the result of material capabilities but depended on state identities which were the result of interaction among states as well.[64][65] This view stressed the relation between social interaction of states and the structure of world politics. It sought to bring Giddens’ structuration theory to bear as a “second order” or “meta-theoretical approach” within IR theorizing.[65][66] Most of this careful and observant reasoning fell through the fault-line politics of the third debate however which did not offer a way of bridging the concepts of ‘interaction’ and ’social facts’ with the context of material facts and power. The decisive push towards constructivist framing has been created by the sociological constructivist research program initiated by Katzenstein and which elaborated on the role of the cultural environment and norms in security politics.[66][67] Subsequent to this push IR theorists developed different ways of approaching the impact of norms in world politics, both on the global and on the domestic levels of policy making.

            At the time, two constructivist groupings were thus roughly distinguishable. The first group of scholars brought insights from the macro-sociological institutionalism of the Stanford School around John Meyer or from Giddens’ structuration theory to IR neo-liberal approaches to IR. They thus favored a distinctly sociological perspective.[67][68] The major goal of this group was to take the impact of social factors such as ideas and the cultural environment seriously.[68][69] This view maintains that while symbolic interaction constructs meaning, it is assumed that social reality does exist beyond the theorists’ view. Following this logic, sociological constructivism stresses the importance of empirical work in order to approach the world out there. This group has been described as sociological or modern constructivism, it kicked off a number of empirical studies on the role of ideas, principled beliefs and norms in world politics.[69][70] More recent work takes this perception of norms further, seeking to assess the process of interaction empirically, for example by studying processes of “arguing”, “persuasion”, the “mediation of meaning”.[70][71]

From an assumption of knowledge as constructed through process, the second group of scholars considers the world ‘out there’ as constructed in itself. It seeks to critically assess the ways in which the world is constructed. This group does not necessarily agree with the former group’s stress on ontology. Taking Kratochwil and Ruggie’s epistemological concern seriously, this approach emphasizes the role of language as constructive towards norms and rules. Following Wittgenstein’s concept of language games, it is assumed that interaction is not reduced to ’speechless’ but communicative behavior. Instead its conceptualization of action includes the practice of speaking a particular language. The assumption is that beyond mere utterances, language constitutes meaning within specific contexts. If successfully performed, speech acts construct particular meanings which constitute a framework for rule-following. This constructivist perspective hence explores the constructive power of language interrelated with rules that are inherent to a specific social context.[71][72]

            Both groups shared the assumption that social action is key to the constitution of social facts, such as for example, identity, linguistic practices, religious beliefs, moral norms.[72][73] The social therefore assumes a significant role in analytical approaches to establish interests and predict behavior, challenges neorealist and neoliberal positions. This said, it is important to note that while constructivist framing is situated at a particular shared time given the larger trajectory of IR as a discipline, the actual theoretical input of the constructivist turn has always been generated from different places, and indeed communities of IR scholars with their own intellectual path-dependencies. For example, debates in the UK, Scandinavia, Germany and Canadian IR have contributed to developments in constructivist thinking.[73][74]

 

4.3 A Third Angle

The point of this brief review was to stress the intersubjective nature of constructivism itself. Theorizing does not develop out of context. Instead, the respective political culture and the participants of a debate bear on the way theories, or, for that matter research programs are shaped, too. To situate constructivism in the IR debating culture, it is helpful to refer back to the theoretical debates which at the end of third debate were best presented by a straight line barely linking the two extreme poles of rationalism and reflectivism. The difference between the two is manifested in mutually exclusive assumptions about endogenous and exogenous interest formation, about individualist and holist approaches, about empiricist and post-positivist approaches, and so on, a gap that offers little choice for synthesis. Constructivist framing, i.e. casting the focus on the ontology of social facts and how to theorize their impact in world politics, has offered a new angle above this straight line (see Figure 1). Thus, in the 1990s, in between these poles a constructivist interface has begun to emerge in the middle ground between the rationalist (neorealist, neoliberal) and reflectivist (postmodernist, poststructuralist) positions of the third debate. 

 

(Figure 1 about here)

Constructivist approaches are developed from positions between these incommensurable theoretical standpoints on the straight line. They are able to ‘talk’ to each pole, albeit with differently weighed preferences, to be sure. Yet, most constructivists take great pains in pointing out aspects of commonality with and distinction from the poles, they “juxtapose constructivism with rationalism and poststructuralism” to then “justify its claim to the middle ground.”[74][75] There are, however, different ways of characterizing this claim to the middle-ground. It has been pointed out that constructivists did not exactly “seize” the middle ground, suggesting it were something akin to a territory that became available as the result of the third (interparadigm) debate. The moves towards framing the constructivist turn within the debating culture of IR suggest a more gradual a process of “establishing” the middle ground.[75][76] The process has expanded according to a logic of arguing over theoretical positions in which the participants are open to persuasion. The starting position of most constructivists is the distance from the rationalist and the reflectivist poles, respectively. While constructivists do not share one epistemological position, the relevance of ontology has provided a central point of discussion among constructivists. However, constructivist positions do not converge on one third angle of the theoretical triangle. Instead, they form stations on a semi-circle over the two incommensurable poles on the baseline (see Figure 2).

 

(Figure 2 about here)

All constructivists keep a distance from the poles thus allowing for variation amongst themselves.[76][77] The semi-circle emerges as each individual constructivist position is formed according to four aspects. They include

(1)               a preference for ontology over epistemology,

(2)               a distinction from the pole positions, yet an ability to engage in talk with both,

(3)               a variation in preferences for methodological tools

(4)               a focus on social facts

The individual positions which contributed to specify stations of focused conversations on the bridge on the semi-circle result from these aspects. Since their distance to the poles varies, so does their position on the semi-circle. The image of this semi-circle is key to constructivist theorizing because it allows for an assessment of the process of situating positions that emerged from debates within the middle ground. The metaphor of establishing the middle-ground reflects the process of arguing about differing positions as a key feature of the constructivist turn.[77][78] Often this positioning enables scholars to embrace a hybrid approach which, while lacking the elegance of a theory (which may, however prove of little use in empirical research), offers the advantage of being open towards conceptual innovation as the result of discussions. For example, Wendt points out that his substantive argument is “philosophical” and as such “cuts across the traditional cleavages in IR between Realists, Liberals, and Marxists, supporting and challenging parts of each as the case may be. Readers will find much below that is associated usually with Realism: state-centrism, the concern with national interests and the consequences of anarchy, the commitment to science. There is also much associated with Liberalism: the possibility of progress, the importance of ideas, institutions, and domestic politics. There is a Marxian sensibility in the discussion of the state.”[78][79]

In sum, while IR used to be a discipline structured by a first uni-lateral and then increasingly bilateral debating culture, the constructivist turn has facilitated a new style of multilateral communication. It allows conversations about theory which are not over-shadowed by either the battle for the only valid paradigm in the Kuhnian sense or the construction of epistemologically opposed camps which agree to disagree because of incommensurable theoretical assumptions in the Lakatosian sense. The fact that constructivist approaches are constantly subject to “de-construction by [...] friendly ontological or epistemological neighbors”[79][80] encourages discussion and through that theoretical advancement. 

 

5 The Constructivist Value-Added: Style and Substance

The preceding sections established changes in style of debate and an increasing focus in substance, stressing the shared interests of constructivists, and the themes of debate. What do these elaborations on style and substance tell us about the value-added of the constructivist turn? Beyond the effect of bridge-building on the middle-ground, the communicative style of interaction that had been introduced by the constructivist frame is characterized by an increasing number of conversations among various approaches to world politics. This paper has argued that the success of the constructivist turn was due to the following factors

(a)                the historical context in world politics (binary perspective of world politics was challenged by end of cold war)

(b)                the cultural environment (debating culture of the discipline) and, last but by no means least,

(c)                the various theoretical approaches which had raised critical questions about the neorealist approach to world politics in the 1980s.[80][81]

A central result of the constructivist turn was moving beyond the (silent) interparadigm debates among mutually exclusive theoretical positions towards a generally more open attitude towards conversations about ontology and methodology.[81][82] The paper has demonstrated that this shift did not occur at one point in time, but as a gradual process including a number of, often parallel, moves. These moves established conversations ‘above’ the poles which are characterized as stations on the bridge (see Figure 3).

 

(Figure 3 about here)

Indeed, more often than not, participants in these discussions do talk to their neighbors on the bridge. For example, the ’social ideas’ station will be most interested in discussions with the ‘dual quality of norms’ and the ‘individual ideas’ stations, respectively, while the ‘language’ station will find the most significant inputs in conversations with the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ‘ and the ‘all social’ stations, respectively. The following elaborates on this choice of presenting constructivist conversations. It is important to note, that this schematic presentation is restricted to those conversations which have been conducted within the accessible frame of the debate. The intention of this presentation is to demonstrate the style which has coined the constructivist turn, i.e. that interaction took among stations took place, and the substance of these conversations, i.e. what has been discussed to what end.

 

5.1 Stations on the Bridge: Style

The first steps towards establishing stations on the bridge ensued from the ontological constructivist move towards theorizing the social based on an analytical focus on changes in social ontologism that were considered important for analyses of world politics. They included the ‘individual ideas’ station, on the one hand, and the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ‘ station, on the other. Further steps built on these innovations and moved on to conceptualize the interactive dimension of ideas and norms, on the one hand, and the structuring role of discourse and language, on the other. They established the ’social ideas’, the ‘language’ and the ‘dual quality of norms’ stations. It is important to note, that while the station-scheme aspires to achieve an organized overview of developments in style and substance of constructivist debates,[82][83] it does not claim to be either systematic or comprehensive. Instead, it is hoped that this presentation raise discussion and interest among and beyond those involved in the constructivist debate with a view to contest, challenge, or add to the scheme. It is worthwhile noting that while moves away from the reflective and rationalist pole stations were at times parallel, interaction among neighboring stations usually led to refine ways of conceptualizing the role of social facts in world politics. For example, the enterprise of “seizing the middle-ground” has been a move away from the rationalist pole, via the neoliberal institutionalist individual ideas station towards the constructivist middle. Celebrating this move should, however, not obscure the steps that were initiated to move away from the other—reflectivist—pole.

While some prefer to distinguish between modern and ‘other’ constructivists pushing a large number of studies out of sight (including Wendt’s first move towards the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ‘ station) into one negatively defined camp, this paper maintains the important contribution to the constructivist debate which has been generated by a series of moves from the reflectivist pole as well. They have equally built stations on the bridge. All stations offer a view on the variety of approaches engaged in theorizing about social facts which is, after all, the main concern of constructivists. The following offers more detailed summaries about the emergence and substance of the various stations. All stations share the “ontological middle ground between individualism and structuralism by claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be reduced to or collapsed into each other.”[83][84] As will become immediately obvious, such this proposition presents an encompassing theoretical challenge.

 

5.2. Stations on the Bridge: Substance

In the following, each station’s effort to analytically substantiate this assumption is summarized. Since this paper asks what do constructivists do (not where do they come from), some scholars’ appear at multiple stations.[84][85] Most stations tend to bend towards either structure or agency. And, as this structured review will demonstrate, the challenge to theorize the distinctive role of social facts to its full potential is still on.

 

Individual Ideas

The first tacit yet clearly expressed move away from the ‘all material’ station at the ‘rationalist’ pole has been pushed by neoliberal institutionalists who found that the role of ideas defined as “beliefs held by individuals, help to explain political outcomes.”[85][86] This approach to the role of individually held ideas as “principled or causal beliefs” sees ideas as “road maps” which are important factors in foreign policy analysis (ibid.). While the step towards including social facts beyond the material resources that inform foreign policy does present a move away from the baseline, it is important to note that this approach to social facts remains clearly anchored in a positivist approach which assumes exogenous interest formation. It is interesting to note though, how this move carefully distinguishes its position from the rationalist and reflectivist pole positions, hence keeping with the practice of positioning (see Figure 2). As Goldstein and Keohane point out in the introduction to an edited volume that the work was composed as “a challenge to both rationalist and reflectivist approaches. Although we concede that the rationalist approach is often a valuable starting point for analysis, we challenge its explanatory power by suggesting the existence of empirical anomalies that can be resolved only when ideas are taken into account. We demonstrate this need to go beyond pure rationalist analysis by using its own premise to generate our null hypothesis: that variation in policy across countries, or over time, is entirely accounted for by changes in factors other than ideas. Like reflectivists, we explore the impact of ideas, or beliefs, on policy. But this volume also poses an explicit challenge to the antiempiricist bias of much work in the reflectivist tradition, for we believe that the role played by ideas can and should be examined empirically with the tools of social science.”[86][87]

This move established the ‘individual ideas’ station on the semi-circle early on. It facilitated a platform for debate among neoliberal institutionalists, neorealists and rational choice institutionalists[87][88] on the one hand, and historical institutionalist, pluralist accounts of ideas as the precursors of sociological constructivist arguments that discussed the role of ideas, norms, and principled beliefs within different cultural environments, on the other. These approaches focus on competing and changing sets of institutionalized “causal ideas” and “norms” which guide action.[88][89] While Peter Katzenstein pointed out the social aspect of norm construction early on, stating that “[N]orms reflect unspoken premises. Their importance lies not in being true or false but in being shared,”[89][90] the role of human interaction as constitutive for individually held ideas, beliefs and norms remained widely unexplored in programs which concentrate on studying formal institutional changes as key contextual variables.[90][91]

In sum, while individual ideas (and the impact of the social) are the focus at this station, the social role of ideas remains underestimated. The shared assumption of the ‘individual ideas’ station was the Weberian perception that ideas and worldviews are held individually.[91][92] As such, ideas are not general indicators of behavior, instead, studying ideas involves the more specific focus on particular actors who embody them. At this point, it is however important to note that while Weber does stress individually held ideas and worldviews, his approach to studying them includes an explicit reference to academic insights as always eventually being a “product of culture.”[92][93] As with any other science, there is no clear-cut general approach to ideas either. Weber also stresses the importance of argumentative interaction about worldviews,[93][94] an issue which has been curiously and notably put on the backburner by constructivists to this day.

 

Contested Concepts

In turn, the role of social interaction was prominently addressed within Giddens’ structuration approach. Drawing on this approach, scholars sought to conceptualize the mutual constitution of structure and agency in world politics was stressed early on by some of the key articles that preceded the constructivist turn and set the stage for the various constructivist moves. This argument was generated within the cold war context of the interparadigm debate. Its focus on the problematic link between an analytical emphasis on social factors and conceptual tools which were squarely grounded in positivism mapped the challenge of theorizing the social in IR.[94][95] This focus on the impact of the social was taken further towards the crucial inclusion of discourse and contested concepts by studies that assumed entire concepts which had been familiarly created within major IR theoretical approaches such as, for example, sovereignty or citizenship as socially constructed and hence, always potentially contested.[95][96] It has also been applied to identify discursively constructed “nodal points” based on Foucauldian, Derridian, and Austinian discourse analysis.[96][97]

To facilitate an assessment of the social dimension in world politics, scholars began to study constitutive practices that were underlying the formation of key concepts in world politics. This station considers concepts as historically contingent, and entailing path-dependent institutional settings, which remain potentially contested.[97][98] These studies moved away from the ‘all social’ station at the reflectivist pole, establishing the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ‘ station in the process. Their focus on constitutive practices linked the ontologies of identity and practice.[98][99] It therefore established an angle on a more systematic yet critical approach towards state-building and identity formation in the international state system. As Weber and Biersteker point out “we must resist the impulse to participate in fixing the meaning and the history of sovereignty through definitional practices and  must instead treat ‘the current political map’ as problematic.”[99][100] The importance of action is therefore, according to this station, to be stressed over structural constraints, following the assumption that “actors reproduce and alter systems through their actions. Any given international system does not exist because of immutable structures; rather, its structures are dependent for their reproduction on the practices of actors.”[100][101]

 

Social Ideas

The perception of ideas as socially shared means a move away from the ‘individual ideas’ station. It puts less an emphasis on individual ideas and more of a stress on the social embeddedness of ideas.[101][102] This social approach to ideas has introduced the notion of  constitutive and regulative norms. Whereas the former station maintained an individualist approach to ideas, this station socializes them. As Thomas Risse points out “[T]his means for the study of ideas that one can continue to study ‘beliefs’ in terms of what is inside people’s minds and simultaneously insist that these beliefs are representations and enactments of social and intersubjective culture.”[102][103] The analytical focus is therefore set on norms and social knowledge as constitutive for the identity of actors. This crucial move towards the question of mutual constitution has led to a strong emphasis on a top-down process of interaction. That is, norms acquire a constitutive role for actors’ identities. “Socially shared ideas—be it norms (collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity) or social knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships—not only regulate behavior but also constitute the identity of actors.”[103][104] Social interaction happens within a particularly regulative or constitutive context, therefore, it is important to establish the relation between context and behavior of actors when studying the implementation of norms.

This assumption about the mutual constitutiveness of norms (social ideas) and identity facilitates a socially informed perspective on behavior. It allows for the definition of different logics of behavior (consequentialist, appropriate, argumentative). This interest in logics of behavior has opened the debate towards rationalist perspectives on cooperation under anarchy in world politics. It has been conducive to a particularly successful series of conversations among rationalist and constructivist institutionalists about rational and normative elements as independent variables in processes of cooperation under anarchy.[104][105] From these conversations emerged, notably, a focus on the logic of arguing, as opposed to the logic of consequentially and the logic of appropriateness.[105][106] This approach has been successfully applied in research on the influence of human rights norms in world politics which stresses the (rational) decision of actors who share particular norms, to make an argument with a view to persuade less convinced actors through socialization (communication, learning, arguing) as well as the process of socialization which is initiated and shaped by this norms.[106][107] A communicative approach to behavior is one way of avoiding the structural overemphasis of norms. It has proved particularly helpful in studies on norm-following, for example, by research that sought to establish the conditions under which international norms are internalized in domestic practices, or, under which conditions identities of social actors change in the context of supranational institutions.[107][108]

Yet, it still leaves the question of how are norms established and change, as a result of this process of interaction, to be answered. Yet, it leaves the question of when norms change, open. It thus keeps with a strong Weberian perception of social ideas which do not stress interaction in the first place. While Weber acknowledges the impact of social relations on the concept of stateness, for example, as “that complex of human relations, norms and norm-determined relations which we call ’state’” (Weber 1988, 162),[108][109] the focus is on the structural properties of norms. The flexible properties depicting them as the result of human interaction remains to be explored. This is not necessarily a flaw in the approach to social ideas, it is mainly a result of the choice of focus on actor’s behavior in decision-making under social constraints. To go beyond the top-down notion of constitutiveness and fully explore the concept of mutual constitutiveness, the flexible dimension of norms is helpfully assessed by other stations on the bridge, for example, the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ,’ the ‘language’ and the ‘dual quality of norms’ station.

 

Language

The ‘language station’ shares the focus on speech-acts that is also advanced by the social ideas station[109][110] and its focus on the mutual constitution of social norms, behavior (arguing) and actor’s identity. While this station accepts the guiding role of rules and norms,[110][111] it approaches constitutive effects of interaction from an almost opposite perspective to that of the ’social ideas’ station. Friedrich Kratochwil argues, for example,

“that our conventional understanding of social action and of the norms governing them is defective because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the function of language in social interaction, and because of a positivist epistemology that treats norms as ’causes’. Communication is therefore reduced to issues of describing ‘facts’ properly, i.e. to the ‘match’ of concepts and objects, and to the ascertainment of nomological regularities. Important aspects of social action such as advising, demanding, apologizing, promising etc., cannot be adequately understood thereby. Although the philosophy of ordinary language has abandoned the ‘mirror’ image of language since the later Wittgenstein, the research programs developed within the confines of logical positivism are, nevertheless, still indebted to the old conception.”[111][112]

            Different from the ’social ideas’ station which conceptualizes norms as social insofar as they are the result of social interaction, yet, norms are not expected to change in the process of the particular decision-making situation under investigation. By contrast, the language approach studies speech-acts as constitutive towards rules. This approach is taken from Wittgenstein’s concept of language games which originate through the interplay of context, speech-act and interaction.[112][113] The role of language games in the explanation and understanding of conflict has been stressed by studies of the social ontology of speech-acts. The concept of the “securitization” of politics offers another approach to the constitutive role of language and the impact of speech acts in world politics. It “examines the distinctive character and dynamics of security [...] arguing that security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues. And it offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization—for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions.”[113][114]

According to this approach, successful speech acts depend on the interaction between the speaker and the facilitating context conditions. They are defined as “a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech. Among internal conditions of a speech act, the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out—the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and so on.”[114][115]

 

Dual Quality of Norms

This station keeps with the shared observation of a crucial link between norms with the social because “rules and norms link individual autonomy to sociality.”[115][116] Different from the individual and social ideas station, it seeks, however, to appreciate the full meaning of sociality. That is, it shares the structural impact of norms – as enabling or constraining structural factors – with the ’social ideas’ station, on the one hand, and the constitutive impact of interaction towards the evolution and change of actors identities and norms with the ‘constitutive practices, contested concepts ‘ and the ‘language’ stations, on the other. It therefore defines the quality of norms as including active (regulative, constitutive) and passive (flexible, constructed) properties.[116][117] This notion of a dual quality of norms emphasizes the social dimension and its impact the definition of legal norms. It has been acknowledge as a shift in perspective from rules to process. “Whereas rules guide and constrain behavior, providing triggers for sanctions, processes perform a wider range of functions: communication, reassurance, monitoring and routinization.”[117][118] Including the social into the analysis of ideas therefore means to understand and operationalize interaction and mutual constitutiveness as having an impact on both, identity and norms. The causal arrows therefore include both dimensions ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’.

While the debate over norms has played a key role in constructivist conversations since the early notion of misfit between a positivist epistemology and an intersubjective ontology,[118][119] it still raises a number of analytically controversial issues. For example, the conceptualization of norms by much of the constructivist literature stresses the structural quality over the flexible quality of norms. Following macrosociological approaches, the regulative role of norms (logic of appropriateness) has received more attention than the constitutive role of norms.[119][120] Norms have been identified as causing isomorphism on a global scale with a constraining impact on behavior, on the one hand, and as strategically created by norm-setters with a view to imposing their guiding quality on designated norm-followers, on the other.[120][121] This approach to norms appears to consider the question of how intersubjectivity fits into the construction of norms as non-problematic. As Flynn and Farrell point out “instead of fully exploiting the power of the insights they borrow from social theory about the recursive nature of the relationship between agent and structure, constructivists have ended up seeking to demonstrate only that norms as elements of structure (alongside material conditions) can determine the interests and identity of agents, rather than seeking to locate the power of norms in the process whereby they are created in the first place.”[121][122] How then, can the insights form social theory on interaction be more fully exploited? 

Norms are a profoundly social phenomenon. Norm-following requires social skills. Without a minimum of social interaction, they will not be recognized. Similarly, norm-construction is based on social interaction as the basic process by which norms are shaped. Accordingly, the impact of norms can only be understood in the context of social behavior. Absent social behavior, norms are neither visible nor constructed. Studying norms therefore requires an understanding of social behavior as well as the tools to analyze intersubjectivity as that crucial process which precedes and follows norm impact. The following chart offers a summary of the conceptual and methodological output that has been produced during a decade of conversations on the bridge (see Table 2).

 

(Table 2 about here)

So far, interaction has been assessed by bringing in concepts from the wider social science framework including practices of arguing, persuasion, mediation of meaning, deliberation, and speech-acts. The questions is then, how are social facts such as ideas, identity, social knowledge and norms linked with interaction? The ’social ideas’ station and the ‘language’ station offer important steps to answer this question by (a) following-up the link between norms and identity construction, and (b) by stressing the interactive role of speech-acts in creating rules of the game, respectively. While it has been demonstrated that norm-following depends on the resonance of norms,[122][123] the more complex issue of the emergence and change of norms requires further attention. How does historical contingency play into the construction of norms? What is the impact of path-dependencies? Are some groups more successful in the strategic creation of norms than others? Can norms be strategically constructed at all, or are they, by definition always social and hence always endogenous to actor’s identities and interests?

 

6 Conclusion

The paper offered an assessment of the value-added of constructivist approaches to study social facts and their role in world politics. Beginning with the two core assumptions that first, the value-added includes more than the some of the constructivist parts, and, secondly, debates about constructivism create a frame for discussion thus facilitating exchange between different theoretical positions, the paper first situated the approach in its context of emergence. It then offered an insight into IR’s debating culture as the environment in which constructivism emerged as part of a cyclical movement of debates in the discipline. It then recalled the key theoretical moves which pushed the debates about theorizing the middle-ground to the fore, and it finally presented the more specific debates among constructivists as conversational moves away from two mutually exclusive pole positions.

            n search of the value-added, the paper took the route of situating constructivist debates within its context of emergence. It asked how and why a converging interest in the impact of social factors emerged, and demonstrated that communicative interaction through constructivism as a frame took a central role in the growing fascination with constructivism. This said, the paper ultimately showed that the debates over constructivist approaches did, indeed, succeed in generating an impressive tool-kit which allows for robust assessments of  the social in world politics. While the ontological focus on ideas, norms, and interaction is widely shared among constructivists and beyond, the conceptualization and operationalization of these categories continues to spur debate among political scientists. With a view to further research, the paper points to the importance of theorizing the ‘dual quality of norms’. While the necessity to isolate norms as key factors in political decision-making has been acknowledge and to a large extent successfully operationalized, we have yet to assess the factors at work in the  process of norm construction.

While the moves on(to) the bridge have been identified as epistemological and ontological moves to begin with, over the past decade or so the ensuing conversations through the constructivist frame present a much more detailed scheme of approaches and analytical categories than often critically acclaimed. Having laid them out in the way this paper offered, I believe, will facilitate further specification of the key analytical problem of constructivists, namely the conceptualization of mutual constitutiveness. This problem is posed by the rising awareness about social facts, as constituted by human interaction. If this constructivist assumption is rigorously followed through, then the act of constitution requires a more detailed focus. So far, the individual ideas station accepts social facts, but falls short of acknowledging the interactive dimension. It can hence operationalize social facts as resources like historical institutionalist do, but it cannot account for their trajectory linking the social and the political realm of world politics.  The social ideas station stresses the importance of interaction and change. It begins with the assumption that social ideas such as norms and social knowledge have an impact on actors’ identities, they are therefore constitutive for decision-making. However, this station still sticks to a structural notion of norms, it stresses their guiding role, and underestimates their ability to change. The constitutive practices, contested concepts  station and the language station have important insights to offer since their focus is more especially on social processes that are constitutive towards the construction of norms. 

The particular dual quality of norms bears potential problems for political scientists, as norms may be stable for a certain amount of time, however, they are also subject to change. When and how do norms change? Can we identify critical junctures which change norms akin to path-dependency analyses of changing institutional settings which have been forwarded by historical institutionalists?[123][124] And, if so, how do daily practices influence the constitution of norms? These questions need to be answered, specifically with a view of the impending constitutionalization of world politics. If this process proceeds, the social institutions beyond the domestic political arena will play a key role in the implementation of the law.[124][125] The norms station hence becomes one key debating arena for this difficult to grasp dual quality of norms. It is at this station in particular where analytical approaches stand to fill in the void of the constructive dimension of norms.

 

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[1][2] Checkel 1998

[2][3] Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998, 646

[3][4] See Christiansen et al. 1999, 535-537, 542-544, Wendt 1999, 39-40, respectively, for a realist expression of the constructivist turn, see Adler’s point of “seizing the middle ground,” Adler 1997.

[4][5] As Risse observes, “There is considerable confusion in the field of international relations about what precisely is at stake in recent controversies between rational choice and social constructivism. Is the debate about the role o ideas or cultural factors as opposed to material interests in political life? Does it concern constitutive norms and identities as opposed to instrumental interests of authors? Does it center on deep ontological, methodological, or even epistemological differences?” (Risse 2000, 2-3)

[5][6] For the difference among constructivists see, for example, Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner who rightly emphasize that “constructivist research is not cut from one cloth” (1998, 680).  As the comparison between say this paper and the former authors’ take of differences among constructivists demonstrates, not only constructivist research, but also the way of situating constructivist positions within the larger field of IR provokes disagreement.

[6][7] Adler 1997, 320

[7][8] This is most explicitly expressed by Thomas Risse’s “Let’s Argue!” (Risse 2000) which draws the extensive debates among rationalist and constructivist institutionalist discussions in the German Journal of International Relations, see also: Jachtenfuchs 1999, 72, Christiansen et al. 1999, Checkel 2000, Wendt 1999. 

[8][9] See Wendt 1999, 35, Ruggie 1998, respectively.

[9][10] Adler 1997, 320

[10][11] See, for example, John Ruggie who refers to “the constructivist project” (Ruggie 1998, 856) in world politics.

[11][12] Checkel 2000

[12][13] See: Adler 1997, 323; see also: Checkel 2000; emph. added AW.

[13][14] A number of scholars have suggested, for example, a classification of constructivist approaches according to their subscription to positivist assumptions, identifying them as ‘modern’ constructivists and, in the process evoking the camp mentality of the arguable helpful debating culture in international relations theories (Wæver 1997, 24; Smith 1999). For a critical response to Smith 1999 and Moravcsik 1999 see Risse and Wiener (1999).

[14][15] Ruggie 1998, 856, see also: Jepperson et al. 1996; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998, 679, Wendt 1999.

[15][16] Wendt 1998, 103

[16][17] For a different approach which keeps stressing the question of epistemology, see Fierke and Jørgensen 2001.

[17][18] Ruggie 1998, 858, Risse 2000, 5

[18][19] See also Risse-Kappen 1995, Risse 2000.

[19][20] Risse summarizes the key values of arguing thus “The goal of communicative action is to seek a reasoned consensus (Verständigung as opposed to Verstehen). In arguing mode, actors try to convince each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned consensus about validity claims. And, in contrast to rhetorical behavior, they are themselves prepared to be persuaded” (Risse 2000, 9).

[20][21] See Lapid 1989, George 1990, Wæver 1996, 1997.

[21][22] See, for example, Ernst Haas’s recent contribution to the discussion of constructivism in European integration (Haas 2001), Tim Dunne’s reconstruction of the English School’s constructivist dimension (Dunne 1995), Thomas Risse among other German contributions on a Habermasian perspective that focuses on communication (Risse 2000), and Martha Finnemore’s summary of the sociological dimension which was prominently fed by work of the Stanford School on world culture (Finnemore 1995).

[22][23] See most explicitly Wæver’s observation of a ’state of war’, 1997, 22. See also Lapid 1989, Whitworth 1989.

[23][24] See Gabriel Almond’s argument for the opposite move, for example, to describe the situation in political science in the 1980s (Almond 1990).

[24][25] Goffman 1974

[25][26] See for example the works of Simmel (applied in IR by Cedermann and Daase, mimeo), on Luhmann (applied in IR by Albert 2000), on Luckmann and Berger (applied more widely in IR and beyond).

[26][27] Wendt 1998, 2000

[27][28] While, for the clarity of the argument about constructivism within the debate in IR this manuscript keeps with the familiar use of these ‘isms’ in the manifold contributions to the literature, it is acknowledged that the labels are nothing but that. They are not to be taken as containers of meaning other than a process of positioning within the debate. Their contestation is not the subject of this paper which seeks to explore what constructivists do, not where they come from. 

[28][29] See Goffman 1974, Rein and Schön, c.f. Lenschow and Zito 1998. The concept of ‘frames’ has been developed in sociology and applied with particular success in the subfield of social movement theories, see Goffman (1974); Snow and Benford (1986, 1992).

[29][30] Lenschow and Zito 1998, Kohler-Koch 2000

[30][31] Snow and Benford 1992, 134

[31][32] Snow and Benford 1992, 136-37

[32][33] See Goffman 1974, 21, c.f. Snow and Benford 1992, 137.

[33][34] Snow and Benford 1992, 138

[34][35] See for a comparison Mayer 1991, on NGOs in general see Wapner 1996.

[35][36] Hence the frequent misunderstanding between philosophers and political theorists, on the one hand, and political scientists, on the other.

[36][37] While I am aware of the fact that power structures did play a considerable role in structuring the disciplinary environment and, indeed, in stressing certain topics of debate over others, the issue of ‘power’ is not the key focus of this paper since the argument focuses on the constitutive elements of the constructivist turn as a move embedded within the disciplinary culture of debates with a view to assessing its analytical value added. For comments on the issue of ‘power’ I am indebted to Jeremy Jennings and Thomas Diez.

[37][38] See Wendt 1999, 38-9; Wæver 1997.

[38][39] Peterson and Bomberg 2000, 30

[39][40] Peterson and Bomberg ibid.

[40][41] See Jepperson et al. 1996; Ruggie 1998

[41][42] Wæver 1997, see in particular Wæver 1997, 10-11

[42][43] For the realist position, see for example, Morgenthau 1946, Wight 1946, for the idealist position see Mitrany 1933, 1943. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff summarize, the ensuing “dichotomy between noble impulses and tendencies toward isolationism was clearly reflected in the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, which outlawed war by moralistic declaration but provided no adequate means of enforcement.” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1996, 11). E.H. Carr stressed the difference among the opponents even more drastically, labeling the idealists as “utopians” whose moral ground and belief in harmony made them underestimate the realist version of state-centric power politics (cf. ibid. 12).

[43][44] See Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1996, 33-35; for the traditionalist position see, for example, Bull 1966, for the behavioralist position Kaplan 1966. 

[44][45] See Thompson 1955, c.f. Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1996, 52.

[45][46] Keohane 1988

[46][47] See Keohane 1989, Wendt 1999, 39, respectively.

[47][48] See Wendt 1999, 38-39; emphasis added,  Wæver 1996, 1997, respectively.

[48][49]  See among others List and Studer 1989, Gunew and Yeatman 1993, Nicholson, L. 1990.

[49][50] Snow and Benford 1992, 138

[50][51] Snow and Benford 1992, 138

[51][52] See Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Wendt 1987, 1992, 1994.

[52][53] See DiMaggio and Powell 1994, March and Olson 1989, Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt 1997.

[53][54] Weber and Biersteker 1996, 285, and 284

[54][55] See Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, Checkel 1999.

[55][56] Research on compliance has been put together by Joerges and Zürn (ECPR Mannheim 1999, add website), on conflict see Fierke 1998, on enlargement see a workshop put together by Schimmelfennig (Darmstadt 2000, add website), on European integration see Jørgensen ed. 1997, Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 1999, 2001, on summaries of new approaches to IR see Albert, Jacobson and Lapid 2001, Fierke and Jørgensen 2001.

[56][57] For details on self-named ‘movement’ towards ‘reconvening the English School’ which has been started by Barry Buzan, see http://www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/ , see critically Wæver 1999.

[57][58] Wendt 1999, 3-4

[58][59] For the first use of the term ‘constructivism’, see Onuf 1989.

[59][60] As they wrote, “(I)nternational regimes are commonly defined as social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas. The emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality. It follows that we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity. Now, consider the fact that the prevailing epistemological position in regime analysis is almost entirely positivistic in orientation. Before it does anything else, positivism posits a radical separation of subject and object. It then focuses on the ‘objective’ forces that move actors in their social interactions. Finally, intersubjective meaning, where it is considered at all, is inferred from behavior. Here, then, we have the most debilitating problem of all: epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology!” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764; emphasis in text)

[60][61] Krasner 1983, 2

[61][62] See: Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764-65; emphases in text.

[62][63] Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 765-766.

[63][64] This paper is aware of the fact that this generalization is not shared by all participating constructivist perspectives. Yet, it is maintained that the possibilities for shared conversations among constructivist positions concentrates on ontology, not on epistemology (see, more in detail, Section 5).

[64][65] See Waltz 1979, Wendt 1987, 1992, respectively.

[65][66] See, for the meta-theoretical reference Giddens 1979, 1990, and for the application to IR Wendt 1987, 1991.

[66][67] See Finnemore 1996; Klotz 1995; Katzenstein ed. 1996.

[67][68] See Finnemore 1995; Katzenstein ed. 1996.

[68][69] For the neoliberal starting position see Goldstein and Keohane eds. 1993.

[69][70] See Katzenstein, Keohane, Krasner 1998, Katzenstein ed. 1996; Risse, Ropp, Sikkink eds. 1999.

[70][71] See Risse 2000, Checkel 2000, Wiener 2001b, respectively.

[71][72] See Hollis and Smith 1990, Onuf 1989, Kratochwil 1989, Fierke 1998, Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde 1998.

[72][73] Ruggie 1998, 858

[73][74] For a thorough overview see Wæver 1998, for noting development, change and perception of intellectual debates on a global level see Berger and Luckmann 1966, 1991, for different socio-cultural perspectives in the fourth debate see Fierke and Jørgensen 2001, Guzzini 2001, Jørgensen 2001, Rosamond 2001, and critically Klotz 2001.

[74][75] Adler 1997, 321

[75][76] Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener  1999

[76][77] For an elaboration of this process with a view to constructivist contributions to European integration studies see Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener  1999.

[77][78] For example, Wendt sees his position as follows, “(G)iven my idealist ontological commitments, therefore, one might think that I should be firmly on the post-positivist side of this divide, talking about discourse and interpretation rather than hypothesis testing and objective reality. Yet, in fact, when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry I am a strong believer in science – a pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for ‘Understanding,’ but science just the same. I am a ‘positivist’. In a sense this puts me in the middle of the Third Debate, not because I want to find an eclectic epistemology, which I do not, but because I do not think an idealist ontology implies a post-positivist epistemology.” (Wendt 1999, p. 39-40)

[78][79] Wendt 1999, 32-33

[79][80] Risse and Wiener 1999, 776. The role and effects of constructivism as a communication frame is most convincingly presented in the ongoing conceptual debate in the German IR journal Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen. See Risse 2000, for a summary of this debate.

[80][81] See Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Walker 1993, Wendt 1987, Onuf 1989.

[81][82] As Wendt observes, “International politics does not present itself directly to the senses, and theories of international politics often are contested on the basis of ontology and epistemology, i.e., what the theorist ’sees.’ Neorealists see the structure of the international system as a distribution of material capabilities because they approach their subject with a materialist lens; Neoliberals see it as capabilities plus institutions because they have added to the material base an institutional superstructure; and constructivists see it as a distribution of ideas because they have an idealist ontology.” (Wendt 1999, 5)

[82][83] Note the difference to summaries of constructivism which are structured according to the emergence of ’schools’ (Manners 2000; Rosamond 2001) with a view to exploring the constructivist contribution within the sociology of knowledge (see also Wæver 1998).

[83][84] Risse 2000, 5

[84][85] For the most encompassing presence in this scheme, see Kratochwil’s work.

[85][86] Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 3

[86][87] Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 6; emph. in text

[87][88] See Garrett and Weingast 1993; Krasner 1993.

[88][89] See Sikkink 1993, 161, Katzenstein 1993, 267.

[89][90] Katzenstein 1993, 268

[90][91] See Katzenstein 1993, 268; Sikkink 1993, 166-167.

[91][92] Weber 1988, 149, 152

[92][93] Weber 1988, 152

[93][94] Weber 1988, 153

[94][95] Giddens 1979, Wendt 1987

[95][96] See Biersteker and Weber 1996, 1; Walker 1993; Weber 1995. Kratochwil defines this contested quality thus “it is our present reality which is, through the drifts of fundamental changes, out of tune with our models and understandings. In this context material factors such as the changes in the technology of destruction have to be noted, as have changes in our ideas concerning issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, governmental powers, etc. Recovering the original is, therefore, not an idle undertaking. But understanding the ‘original’ is only a first, although indispensable, step. The second step entails going beyond the conventional conceptual divisions and their constitutive assumptions, and casting a fresh and unobstructed look of how – in the case of my research – norms and rules ‘work’, i.e., what role they play in molding decisions.” (Kratochwil 1989, 4)

[96][97] See Fierke 1998 and Diez 1999, respectively.

[97][98] See Tilly 1996, Hanagan and Tilly 1999.

[98][99] Weber and Biersteker 1996, 278

[99][100] Weber and Biersteker 1996, 283

[100][101] Koslowski and Kratochwil 1995, 128

[101][102] For a good summary of this move, see Flynn and Farrell 1999, 510.

[102][103] Risse 2000, 5-6

[103][104] Risse 2000, 5

[104][105] See the German debate in particular, among others, see for the rationalist contributions Keck 1997, Zangl and Zürn 1996, for the constructivist contributions see Müller 1994, Risse 1995.

[105][106] See Müller 1994, Risse 1995, Schimmelfennig 1997, Risse 2000.

[106][107] See Sikkink’s model in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999, 12, as well as Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898.

[107][108] See Risse and Sikkink 1999, 1 and Checkel 2000, 1, respectively.

[108][109] Translation by the author, for the German original citation is “[J]ener Komplex menschlicher Beziehungen, Normen und normbestimmter Verhältnisse, die wir ‘Staat’ nennen.” (Weber 1988, 162).

 

 

 

[109][110] See Risse’s explicit reference to Habermas’s roots in the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle, as well as his reference to the often unnoticed but very important work by Kratochwil and Onuf (Risse 2000, 7-9).

[110][111] “… rules and norms are viewed as means to maintain social order” (Kratochwil 1989, 1).

[111][112]  Kratochwil 1989, 5-6, emphasis in text

[112][113] See Fierke 1998, Fierke and Nicholson 2001.

[113][114] Buzan, Wæver, Jaap 1998,  vii, see also Huysmans 1998.

[114][115] Buzan, Wæver, Jaap 1998, 32-33

[115][116] Kratochwil 1989, 70

[116][117] For an elaboration on the ‘dual quality of norms’ see Wiener 2001b.

[117][118] Slaughter 1993, 209

[118][119] See first, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, see with hindsight Flynn and Farrell 1999, 509.

[119][120] But see Risse 2000

[120][121] Finnemore and Sikkink 1998

[121][122] Flynn and Farrell 1999, 510-511

[122][123] See: Klotz 1995, Checkel 1999 on resonance with norms.

[123][124] See North 1990, Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Marcussen et al. 1999.

[124][125] See Weber 1988, Curtin and Dekker 1999, Zürn and Wolf 1999.