Catastrophic Terrorism and the International System

by Stephen E. Sachs (International Relations, Merton College, Oxford Week 8, Michaelmas Term 2003)

 

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, demonstrated the need for a complete reassessment of the existing threats to international security. Writing shortly after Sept. 11, Seyla Benhabib suggested two “unprecedented aspects of our current condition”: first, “the emergence of non-state agents capable of waging destruction at a level hitherto thought to be only the province of states,” and second, “the emergence of a supranational ideological vision with an undefinable moral and political content, which can hardly be satisfied by ordinary political tactics and negotiations.”[1] To which one could perhaps add a third: the growing potential for catastrophic violence to be inflicted instantaneously in the course of a single operation, such as through the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The combination of these three factors poses a new kind of security threat to nations such as the United States, one perhaps more severe than any to which those nations are accustomed. Yet the possibility of catastrophic terrorism also threatens the nature of the international order, giving states which are the targets of terrorism strong incentives to act outside current norms of the international system. Proposals to address terrorism through globally accepted means, such as a strengthened international law-enforcement framework or aid targeted to the “root causes” of terror, are either unlikely to succeed in the short term or unlikely to be accepted by states under threat. As a result, the potential for unilateral military action in contravention of previous norms on the use of force has greatly increased. Unless the international community is willing to revise those norms to give greater latitude to counterterrorist efforts, one can expect greater frictions within the international community to be a further consequence of the new kind of terrorism.

The change in the requirements of international security has its source in a change in the nature of terrorism. As Benhabib noted, the most striking change is the growth in power of non-state actors, some of whom (such as al Qaeda) represent transnational networks devoted to terrorism. Although the United States, Louise Richardson argues, “generally perceives international terrorism as deliberately directed by governments,” much modern terrorism is the work of actors who are not under the direct control of any state.[2] Financial or logistical support for a group may purchase influence, but not control over its activities; by analogy, U.S. aid to Israel did not give it complete control over Israeli foreign policy, nor did the Afghan mujehadeen feel compelled to support U.S. initiatives after the Soviets had left. Cases of direct government control of terrorist organizations are relatively rare, and it is more common for groups to receive training, funds, and safe haven from a variety of different governments at once (often specifically to avoid such relationships of dependence.)[3] Though such patrons of terrorism may bear moral responsibility for the actions of their clients, Richardson argues, they are not responsible in any direct sense, and may not have had prior knowledge of an attack even if they welcome it.[4]

More concerningly, terrorist networks are emerging which operate almost entirely on “private” funding and organization. The al Qaeda network relies on modern communications technology to coordinate a vast array of non-hierarchical cells, setting its own agenda and raising its own funds. Osama bin Laden, for example, possesses a vast personal fortune and has been reported to own or control some 80 companies worldwide, including much of the economic production of the Sudan.[5] Ian Lesser notes that terrorist groups have increasingly sought to raise funds through criminal activity, such as the drug trade; links between transnational terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations, especially given the “enormous sums of money involved,” can “facilitate acts that would be difficult for politically motivated terrorist groups to undertake–and pay for–on their own.”[6] Al Qaeda’s sophisticated organization and independent funding has enabled it to act as a significant player on an international scene previously dominated by sovereign states.

The Changing Definition of Security

by Stephen E. Sachs (International Relations, Merton College, Oxford Week 5, Michaelmas Term 2003)

 

What are the principal difficulties involved in attempts to define ’security’?  How has the concept been extended beyond traditional concern with the military security dilemmas facing states?

 

A traditional definition of the state, often attributed to Max Weber, required as a necessary condition the effective monopoly on the use or licensing of violence within a given territory.  The security of states was therefore threatened by any change that might threaten that monopoly of violence–whether through external invasion or internal rebellion.  In the Westphalian world of (internally) strong states, there is less danger of internal conflict, and the international system is marked by conflicts among states rather than within them.  Since 1945, however, many of the most significant threats to state security have been internal, rather than external, a shift which has only accelerated and which may have profound consequences for the conduct of international relations.

As the predominant concerns of security strategists have changed, however, there has also been a more fundamental rethinking of the very framework of state security.  If many of the newly created states of the formerly colonized world are still quite weak, perhaps the security of the state apparatus–which may, after all, be the oppressive tool of an elite–ought not to be as significant a concern.  A new concept, at times given the name of “human security,” has been suggested to express the need of individuals for safety in other arenas of basic need–access to clean food and water, environmental and energy security, freedom from economic exploitation, protection from arbitrary violence by the police, gangs, or domestic partners, etc.  However, while this concept may be useful in indicating the variety of human needs that must be satisfied, it is far too expansive to be an effective policy goal, and does not offer an appealing alternative to traditional conceptions of security.

The need for a new understanding of security is revealed by the changing nature of war over the last 250 years.  In the 18th and 19th centuries, wars were generally short, lasting only two years or so between the declaration of war and the signing of the peace treaty.  Since the experience of the two World Wars, however, the nature of conflict has changed. Cross-border war has become a primarily “small- or medium-power activity,” and thus the attention of great powers has been focused on other types of conflicts.[1]  Wars are often conducted ‘unofficially,’ without formal declarations of their beginning or end, and such conflicts may drag on for decades (as in the case of Ulster).[2]  Kalevi Holsti notes that security between states in many areas–the Third World, the former Soviet Union, etc.–”has become increasingly dependent on security within those states.”[3]  In the Third World, the security threats to the state apparatus are far more frequently internal than external, especially given that many decolonized nations were formed containing substantial linguistic, cultural, or ethnic minorities with few ties to the state.

Many of the intrastate wars we have witnessed therefore concern questions of national liberation, unification, or secession–questions “of statehood and the nature of community within states.”[4]  These “people’s wars” often make no distinctions between soldiers and civilians, and thus result in extraordinarily high civilian death tolls.  Moreover, because they are not conducted by states which have limited goals and a strong interest in self-perpetuation as an organized group, the “ordinary cost-benefit analyses that underlie wars as a ‘continuation of politics by other means’ no longer apply.”[5]  In some areas, the breakdown in order has been so severe as to create conflicts reminiscent of the Thirty Years’ War, when “warfare seemed to escape from political control; to cease indeed to be ‘war’ in the sense of politically-motivated use of force by generally recognized authorities, and to degenerate instead into universal, anarchic, and self-perpetuating violence.”[6]

Rethinking Neorealist Theory: Order Within Anarchy

By Dr. Bruce Bordner (University of Virginia, December 1997)

 

Introduction        

It has been more than eighteen years since Kenneth Waltz first introduced his structural based “Neorealist” theory of international relations.  The purpose of this article is to assess how well this theory holds up nearly twenty years later.  Three specific areas of neorealist theory will be examined: the issue of anarchy, the role of international organizations, and the growing international economic interdependence.  The discussion will proceed as follows.  First, this paper will summarize Waltz’s theory of international relations.  This will include a discussion of states being security seeking, but not power maximizing.  Second, it will examine the issue of anarchy.  Specifically, the role played by hierarchies within anarchy.  Third, it will analyze the role played by cooperation and international organizations in neorealism.  Fourth, this paper will examine the growing economic interdependence among the world’s nations.  Lastly, it will reach several conclusions.  First, that international anarchy does not prevent an ordering of nations within the international community.  Nations can balance against other nations, or they can form hierarchies and balance one hierarchy against one or more rival hierarchies.  Second, that there is a role for international organizations in international relations.  These conclusions will be proposed in a modified version of Waltz’s theory of international relations.  This modified theory will be based upon the existence of order within the anarchic international system.

 

Waltz’s Theory of International Relations

            Structural realism attempts to explain the nature of international relations by separating the state level, which Waltz defines as composed of units, from the systems level, which is composed of structure.  Waltz believes that “[a]t the systems level, we find results; at the subsystems level, causes.” (Waltz: 43).  Waltz assumes that states are security seekers.  He finds that anarchy exists on the international level.  Anarchy exists on the first dimension of what Waltz terms structure.  Furthermore, Waltz describes power on the state level as being distributed hierarchically, while in the international community it is distributed horizontally.  Next, he assumes that security seeking states are composed of units. States as units are the second dimension of structure.  As states are security seeking, states tend to replicate each other on the unit level, thus leading to a balancing behavior.  Assuming states tend to replicate due to balancing, Waltz concludes that the second dimension structure drops out.  The third dimension of structure in Waltz’s theory finds that the distribution of capabilities is largely determined by the number of great powers in the international community.  Utilizing his simple elegant theory, Waltz finds that there is a substantial connection between the number of great powers and how states in the international community act and re-act, such as why states build arms, form alliances, trade, imitate each other, as well as estimate the probability of war among nations.

Nobody Here But Us Liberals: Competing Liberal Theories of International Relations and the International Relations of Ethnic Conflict

By Stephen M. Saideman and  Young Choul-Kim (Texas Tech University)

 

Abstract

            The democratic peace debate has taken a new turn, focusing on a debate among liberal theorists about what drives foreign policy: domestic structures, democratic norms, economic interests, international norms and institutions, or domestically derived preferences.  This article takes this debate to a different realm—from that of interstate war to taking sides in ethnic conflicts in other countries.  As the various liberal strands are more likely to have competing predictions in this second area, we should not only see clearer some of the logical contradictions between different liberal approaches but also determine whether certain liberal arguments better capture what states actually do.  The article derives testable hypotheses from several strands of liberal thought and applies them to a dyadic dataset of ethnic groups and states to see what relationships exist.  We find that ethnic ties, which is how we conceive of preferences here, shapes the behavior of states towards ethnic groups in other countries more than domestic structures.  Other liberal arguments, such as common interests (states facing separatism do not support separatist groups), economic interests, and democratic norms either do not matter that much or have an effect opposite from what liberals would usually argue.  We conclude by focusing on liberalism as a preference-centered approach.

 

Acknowledgements

First, a grant from Texas Tech University’s Research Enhancement Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York made the creation of this dataset possible.  Of course, the statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and not of the Carnegie Corporation.  Second, I owe a dept to Ted Gurr, Anne Pitsch, Deepa Khosa and the rest of the Minorities at Risk project for providing me with their dataset and raw data, and for helping me in using it.  Third, I am grateful to Douglas Van Belle, as he helped me develop my indicators for relative power.  Likewise, James Fearon provided crucial assistance in suggesting how to use code language differentials, although his advice related to a different project.   Finally, I am very thankful for the research assistance provided by Cari MacDonald and J.W. Justice.

 

Introduction

            The democratic peace debate has followed an interesting trajectory.  At first, scholars sought to show that a correlation existed between democracy and peace (Chan 1984; Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993).  Since then, adherents and critics have engaged in lively discussions about whether significant relationships exist and what might be causing these relationships.[1]  Now, the debate has evolved to the point where liberal theorists are arguing with each other about the causes of this phenomena.[2]  Eric Gartzke (1998, 2000) has argued that common interests have caused democracies not to fight with each other.  Bruce Russett and John Oneal (1997, 1999) have strongly disagreed, arguing that democratic institutions, international organizations, and economic interdependence have bound democracies together, creating a zone of peace among them.  They both might be right, but their differences raise questions about liberal international relations theory.

As liberal theory develops as a paradigm for understanding international relations, it makes sense to work out the conflicting claims that flow from core liberal assumptions and deductions.  The problem with using the democratic peace as the battleground for various liberal arguments is that they largely predict the same outcome, so scholars have to argue about which factors have more causal weight.[3]  Focusing on where liberal theories produce conflicting expectations should provide clearer understandings of the insights and limitations provided by the different approaches.  This article applies several strands of liberal thought to the international politics of ethnic conflict to determine which ones provide better accounts not only of this particular issue, but of foreign policy in general.