Agency and Structure in International Relations

By Nick Srnicek

 

One of the difficulties in thinking the agency/structure problem in international relations is that the “agent” – the state – is clearly not a unified and rational actor in any usual sense. While sociology can (more) plausibly analyze the agency/structure problematic in terms of individuals and society, the agent of IR is itself composed of multiple groups at the domestic level.

This of course immediately reveals the weakness of rational choice theory within IR, since it relies on a unified actor who understands its preferences clearly and acts coherently. In my mind, this is a fatal weakness of rational choice, but its proponents tend to believe the assumption of a unified, rational actor is necessary for the parsimony of the theory. It’s interesting reading through much of the IR literature, for clearly most practitioners want to be taken seriously as a science – one based on the natural sciences, with economics being the closest social science approximation. Yet, despite their explicitly scientific aims, many IR theorists promote their particular theories in terms of theoretical values. In other words, despite the empiricism that lies at the heart of any science, many prominent IR theories wholeheartedly eschew the complexity of the world for the simplifications of theory. Now, clearly, any science has to simplify its object in some manner – but a problem arises when this simplification is taken as a value in itself. So in IR, it’s common to see an extensive focus placed on the parsimony of theories, as well as a denunciation of adding in too many variables – despite the fact that it’s these extra variables that are central to the real-world dynamics of the international system. Instead of constantly trying to break the system down into smaller and more manageable component parts, while leaving aside the complexity of the whole, IR should strive precisely to think the whole with full knowledge of its complexity.

Now, some in the field of IR have indeed criticized the focus on the state as a unitary actor, and worked to offer competing views. Some have moved towards opening up the black box of the state and developed theories about how domestic political groups interact to create the state’s foreign policies. Others have focused on individual decision-makers and the role they play in determining international outcomes (an excellent example of this is also portrayed in the film, Fog of War). Lastly, some have looked laterally from the state to other international groups such as formal international organizations and, more generally, international regimes, along with transnational social movements. All of these have contributed to developing a more complex picture of the international world. The problem, as of now, is that there’s no systematic synthesis of all these competing views. So again, we’re left with component parts split up into manageable areas, while avoiding the interrelatedness of these pieces.

International Relations: One World, Many Theories

By Stephen M. Walt

 

Source: Foreign Policy. Washington: Spring 1998., Iss. 110;  pg. 29, 16 pgs

 

Introduction

Why should policymakers and practitioners care about the scholarly study of international affairs? Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one’s basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories-whether he or she knows it or not-and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes.

Take, for example, the current debate on how to respond to China. From one perspective, China’s ascent is the latest example of the tendency for rising powers to alter the global balance of power in potentially dangerous ways, especially as their growing influence makes them more ambitious. From another perspective, the key to China’s future conduct is whether its behavior will be modified by its integration into world markets and by the (inevitable?) spread of democratic principles. From yet another viewpoint, relations between China and the rest of the world will be shaped by issues of culture and identity: Will China see itself (and be seen by others) as a normal member of the world community or a singular society that deserves special treatment?

In the same way, the debate over NATO expansion looks different depending on which theory one employs. From a “realist” perspective, NATO expansion is an effort to extend Western influence-well beyond the traditional sphere of U.S. vital interests-during a period of Russian weakness and is likely to provoke a harsh response from Moscow From a liberal perspective, however, expansion will reinforce the nascent democracies of Central Europe and extend NATO’S conflictmanagement mechanisms to a potentially turbulent region. A third view might stress the value of incorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland within the Western security community, whose members share a common identity that has made war largely unthinkable.

No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. Although we should take care to emphasize inventiveness over invective, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.

 

Where are we Coming From?

The study of international affairs is best understood as a protracted competition between the realist, liberal, and radical traditions. Realism emphasizes the enduring propensity for conflict between states; liberalism identifies several ways to mitigate these conflictive tendencies; and the radical tradition describes how the entire system of state relations might be transformed. The boundaries between these traditions are somewhat fuzzy and a number of important works do not fit neatly into any of them, but debates within and among them have largely defined the discipline.

Canada in the Web of Thoughts: Position and Influence in the International Community

By   Nikola Hynek

 

Abstract

This article examines the consequences of Canada‘s distinct state identity in the international system. There are recognized two dimensions of state identity- internal and external one. Various approaches to the study of nation and a relationship between culture, anarchy, and identity resulting into a paradigmatic shift within the discipline of international relations are examined. Subsequently two problem areas- Canada’s self-image and Canada‘s self-construction of middle power identity are analyzed. The paper concludes the necessity to shift from the rational and ´objective´ logic towards the socially constructed logic of appropriateness. State identity, after all, is an intersubjectively shared social construct.     

 

Introduction

            This article examines the consequences of Canada‘s distinct state identity in the international system. There are recognized two dimensions of state identity- internal and external one. Various approaches to the study of nation and a relationship between culture, anarchy, and identity resulting into a paradigmatic shift within the discipline of international relations are examined. Then, two problem areas- Canada’s self-image and Canada‘s self-construction of middle power identity are analyzed. The paper concludes that there is necessary to shift from the rational and ´objective´ logic toward the intersubjectively perceived and socially constructed logic of appropriateness.   

 

Canada as a Post-National Nation: Contradictio in Adiecto?

The most commonly used term referring to a state identity (i.e. identity regarding sovereign units in the international system) is, paradoxically, national identity. Does this supposedly ´innocent´ confusion have any real consequences for conceptualizing Canada’s collective identity? Would it mean that one might employ interchangeably the terms of statehood and nationhood without changing the meaning of the contents? As a starting point to explore Canada’s identity there is a need to get some kind of methodological grip. Before examining Canada’s distinct identity in the international system, its liaison with the concept of nation need to be elucidated.

            Conceptualizing nation is widely considered an indispensable prerequisite for understanding societal norms and social institutions. It is possible to distinguish several partly complementary and overlapping insights to the concept of nation. Ernest Gellner (1983) provides us with the first approach. In his view the nation came into existence during the process of industrialization and modernization. In Gellner’s logic,

“modernization refers to a complex and interrelated set of social changes that transform agrarian societies and their simple patterns of hierarchy and religious integration into complex industrial, secular societies, with large-scale bureaucratic states, and complex and shifting patterns of hierarchy and integration. Modern bureaucracies require that the populace can read the forms it produces and the directives it issues. Above all, complex and potentially fragmentary societies require shared ideas and meanings that link people together into a common project. All of this requires the mass education of population.” (quoted from Guibernau and Goldblatt 2000: 125-126; emphasis added)

The second view is Benedict Anderson’s concept of nations as imagined communities. There is persuasive evidence that imagined communities of nations have served as a legitimate principle throughout the history. Anderson asserts that,

Politics of Secularism and International Relations

by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd

 

It has been suggested that the rise of religion confronts international relations theory with a theoretical challenge comparable to that of the end of the Cold War or the emergence of globalization.  I agree.  To understand why we need to turn to the politics of secularism.  How might we think about secularisms, in the plural, as forms of political authority in contemporary international relations?  What does this mean for IR theory and the resurgence of religion?  What kinds of politics follow from different forms of secular commitments, traditions, habits, and beliefs?

My work brings debates from sociology of religion, philosophy, and political theory into international relations with the intention of refiguring a field that has virtually ignored questions involving how the categories of religion and politics shape international affairs.  The secularist division between religion and politics is not fixed but socially and historically constructed.  The failure to recognize that this is the case helps to explain why IR — both IR theory and in terms of the practices of international politics — has been unable to come to terms with secularism and religion (they go together) as forms of authority in world politics.  Overcoming this problem — opening up the black box of secularism, digging into the complex negotiations that take place inside this box — allows for a better understanding of empirical puzzles in international relations involving the politics of religion such as conflict between the United States and Iran, controversy over the enlargement of the European Union to include Turkey, the rise of political Islam, and global religious resurgence.

Secularism refers to a series of social and historical traditions.  These sets of practices have developed over time, and each has a history.  These traditions both rely upon and help to produce particular understandings of “religion,” of political Islam, of religious resurgence, of “normal” politics, and so forth.  Think about the fact that we don’t hear much about political Christianity, or political Judaism — this is subsumed for the most part under “normal politics,” but we do hear about political Islam.  To figure out why this is the case, and what the consequences are politically, was one of the motivating puzzles of The Politics of Secularism in International Relations.  The division between religion and politics embodied in various secular traditions is neither stable nor universal.  Take Craig Calhoun’s suggestion that we approach nationalism as a discourse within which political struggles are conducted.  Secularism, adapting his formulation, “is not the solution to the puzzle [of politics and religion] but the discourse within which struggles to settle the question are most commonly waged.”  Secularism is an authoritative discourse, a “tradition of argumentation.”  It is a resource for collective mobilization and legitimation, a language in which moral and political questions are settled, legitimated, and contested.  It is a form of political authority, a language of politics.

Two trajectories of secularism have been influential in international politics: laicism, and what I call Judeo-Christian secularism.  Laicism refers to a separationist narrative in which religion is expelled from politics, and Judeo-Christian secularism to an accommodationist narrative in which Judeo-Christian tradition is perceived as the fount and foundation of secular democracy.  These varieties of secularism don’t map cleanly onto one country or one individual — both appear in different modes in different times and places.  They are discursive traditions, collections of practices with a history.  Each defends some form of the separation of church and state, but in different ways, with different justifications and political consequences.