Book Review: Globalization and International Relations Theory

By Hallie Jones

 

Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

 

In his book, Globalization and International Relations Theory, Ian Clark systematically juxtaposes competing lines of scholarship in International Relations against Globalization literature. He explores the rise of literature on globalization and the specific implications it has on International Relations theory. Clark’s central theme is to construct a basis from which to promote his plea; to develop a new theoretical framework for analyzing the global system and the nation-states within it. Clark calls for a holistic approach to the study of the international system, one that treats globalization and the states not as mutually exclusive, but as mutually reinforcing.

Clark presents a social constructivist approach to the study of international relations. He is essentially asking if the gap can be bridged between competing perspectives reasoning that it’s crucial to developing a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the international system and the states which create it. Specifically, it appears that Clark seeks to develop a grand theory of sorts, which encompasses all components of the system (economic, social, cultural) and all units or levels of analysis (international, state, individual). He is committed to the notion of bringing competing sides of the theoretical “divide” together under his proposed method of inquiry.

Clark addresses the “great divide” throughout his volume, marshaling concepts and lines of argument against one another in an effort to demonstrate their polarizing effects. To Clark, the debates are inherently binary and present dichotomous oppositions which stagnate and prevent our level of understanding from advancing beyond the current trap. His scathing criticism makes his position clear that the debate between state-centric and globalization theories is a futile, “narrow and unenlightened” endeavor, like a dog chasing its own tail. He is passionately dedicated to squashing the current debate, which monopolizes academic discussions, in favor of a new approach that attempts to blend both perspectives in a way that analyzes the system as a whole with many interconnected parts.

An accurate analogy of Clark’s petition could be compared with the medical examination of the human body. A physician does not study the heart alone; they also examine additional internal parts such as the vascular system, muscles, and the consistency of the blood. Yet, the physician does not stop there. They take into consideration external variables (which could possibly seem extraneous) such as stress, lifestyle and dietary patterns. The body is analyzed from numerous different perspectives, yet treated as a single unit, a human, nominally. This is the approach Clark is calling for to analyze international relations and globalization, as a full spectrum where the “globalized state” serves as the fundamental unit of analysis.

Clark vehemently denies the suggestion that the importance of the state is receding, implied by globalization literature. Globalization literature argues that international structures, such as transnational corporations and NGO’s, threaten the identity and sovereignty of the state. This line of logic runs parallel to Political theories based on territorial concepts which once defined the state. Normatively, it is argued that domestic citizenship values decrease with declining state autonomy, or simply put, citizenship is “devalued”.

Clark forcefully interjects the relevance and role of the nation-state in creating and manifesting the global structure, calling these lines of theory into question. He is defensive of his position. He attempts to head off any tendency to criticize his approach as being merely state-centric by incorporating globalization as an equally important consideration. To Clark, the state should be perceived as reconstituting itself, or dynamic in nature, which is operating within the context of globalism while simultaneously creating it. Clark sites Armstrong to make his point, “…it is instructive that we regard globalism not as a mere environment in which states find themselves but as an element within the shifting identity of the state itself.” So, the state embodies globalism as globalism embodies the state.

Additionally, Clark addresses competing “unified” theoretical apparatuses for approaching IR and globalization, including world-systems theory and IPE. He criticizes these approaches for conceiving of the political realm as secondary to or “lagging behind” other categorical areas of inquiry (capital, cultural, social).

Clark is calling for these particular theorists to move beyond presenting a critique that is purely rooted in economics. He notes the apparent disjunction between the political and economic, and calls for the transformational nature of globalism to be added as a consideration, placing it in the context of other subcategories and units of analysis. To their credit, however, Clark concedes that these theorists do at least confront the divide between internal and external by reducing both to functional properties of an integrated system.

Clark addresses constructivism and comments that the problem with most constructive theory is that it happens to be politically uninteresting. He believes constructivism and the concept of mutual constitution can be reconfigured into a sexier line of argument by interjecting an account of the “costs, sacrifice, and pain”. To Clark, if constructivism is to emerge as an intellectually intriguing perspective, it must recognize political costs and the asymmetrical balance at play in the dynamics of the relationship.

Clark questions the notions of “community”, both domestically based on a spatially defined identity, and internationally, and notes that the basis of community is dependent upon how it is understood. He positions positive and negative viewpoints of globalization against one another, asking if community is a given or if it grows. He marshals the argument that economic inequalities compromise international community by undermining the basis for a common identity against arguments predicated on normative optimism, claiming notions of a globalized community are created through international solidarity and transnational relations. Clark challenges the concept that communities even exist domestically and cites Robertson’s assertion that it’s essentially an “imagined community”.

Churn, Change and Religious Revivalism

By Ronnie D. Lipschutz

 

[I]n the seventeenth century…men were said to have a property not only in land and goods and in claims on revenue from leases, mortgages, patents, monopolies, and so on, but also a property in their lives and liberties (Macpherson, 1978: 7).

 

Whiteness is not simply and soley a legally recognized property interest.  It is simultaneously an aspect of self-identity and of personhood, and its relation to the law of property is complex (Harris, 1993: 1725).

 

As status hierarchies weaken, it takes considerably greater effort to keep subordinate groups subordinate and inferior meanings inferior.  Lower status groups feel able to assert themselves and demand greater respect.  Higher status groups experience increasing fears that they will suffer a corresponding loss of prestige in the non-Paretian world of social status.  People certain their superior social status may treat their social inferiors with indulgence and even paternal affection, but when the status barriers beging to break down, their rhetoric turns to fear, anger, and hate.  They can no longer afford the luxury of condescension (Balkin, 1997: 2334)

 

Introduction

This is a article about three, related topics: capitalism, property, and social movements.  There is a connection between capitalism, identities and social movements, one that is hardly captured by standard theories of resource mobilization or opportunity structures or “new social movements.”  In this book, I claim that there is a deep structural linkage between capitalism and the political behaviors of social forces organized in groups, one that arises from the alienating and commodifying tendencies of capital, on the one hand, and the struggles of individuals and groups to achieve and retain their autonomy-in-the-self, on the other.  This is not a deterministic argument; rather, it is about the constraints imposed on agents acting politically in marketized environments and how those agents confront, oppose and resist those constraints.

The dynamism of capitalism, ongoing power struggles among domestic and transnational social forces, and the actions or inactions of the American state constantly threaten to undermine established and long-standing hierarchies of power, wealth, and status, along with their ideological justification and the “common sense” they instill in bodies politic.  Individual and collective identities are deeply vested in both cultural and material aspects of daily and social life and, when some part of those identities appears threatened, a closing around other parts can develop. Indeed, as we shall see, such periods of disruption are often associated with what are generally called “industrial revolutions,” and they tend to revolve around conflicts within elites, over changing belief systems.[1]  For reasons having to do with the historical development of the nation-state, these belief systems have, historically, been rooted in religion—even though social and political elites are not themselves always particularly devout.  Thus, the great culture wars of the American past and the American present have been fought in largely religious terms, even though the sources and symptoms of conflict have been attributable, at least in part, to material transformations across society.

Fostering Ethical Globalization: An interview with Michael Doyle

By Sacha Tessier-Stall

In Policy Innovations, March 19, 2008

 

Tackling issues of international ethics is Michael Doyle’s day job. A former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, he is currently the Harold Brown Professor of U.S. Foreign and Security Policy at Columbia University, where he teaches global governance. Policy Innovations recently sat down with Doyle to discuss globalization. Globalization means many things. Some define it as increasing international trade and migration. Others see globalization as the creation of a “global village” based on ever-expanding technological innovation. Many have suggested that globalization could replace anarchy and antagonism as a template for understanding international politics. Some say it explains political and economic developments, as international actors adopt pro- and antiglobalization positions.

For Doyle, this approach, “though a descriptively accurate representation of increasing interdependence, remains uninformative.” Globalization is not of much use as a doctrine, he argues, since it does not contain implicit prescriptions flowing from a political context. Neither does it constitute a relevant moral or political template for addressing the needs and responsibilities of various participants.

“For some, globalization is good; for others, it’s bad; and for still others, it’s trivial,” he points out. Doyle is one of the leading proponents of democratic peace theory, which, in some circles, has become known as Doyle’s Law. In general terms, democratic peace theory holds that liberal democracies rarely go to war with each other due to their internal cultures of tolerance and respect for the rule of law.

In a famous 1992 article, Benjamin Barber argued that the post-Cold War era would increasingly see the forces of tribalism and globalization clashing as the trend toward cultural standardization provoked a violent backlash. He called this struggle “Jihad vs. McWorld.” While conceding that globalization is not a smooth and linear process, Doyle argues that making it a scapegoat for the world’s problems is unfair. Radicalism in the Muslim world does not stem from globalization, he says, but rather is “a product of their failed modernization, over which we [North Americans and Europeans] superimpose our own chauvinism.”

“The Capitalist Threat”

by George Soros

 

From Atlantic Monthly, Volume 279, No. 2, February 1997

 

What kind of society do we want? “Let the free market decide!” is the often-heard response. That response, a prominent capitalist argues, undermines the very values on which open and democratic societies depend.

IN The Philosophy of History, Hegel discerned a disturbing historical pattern — the crack and fall of civilizations owing to a morbid intensification of their own first principles. Although I have made a fortune in the financial markets, I now fear that the untrammeled intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic society. The main enemy of the open society, I believe, is no longer the communist but the capitalist threat.

The term “open society” was coined by Henri Bergson, in his book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932), and given greater currency by the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper, in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). Popper showed that totalitarian ideologies like communism and Nazism have a common element: they claim to be in possession of the ultimate truth. Since the ultimate truth is beyond the reach of humankind, these ideologies have to resort to oppression in order to impose their vision on society. Popper juxtaposed with these totalitarian ideologies another view of society, which recognizes that nobody has a monopoly on the truth; different people have different views and different interests, and there is a need for institutions that allow them to live together in peace. These institutions protect the rights of citizens and ensure freedom of choice and freedom of speech. Popper called this form of social organization the “open society.” Totalitarian ideologies were its enemies.

Written during the Second World War, The Open Society and Its Enemies explained what the Western democracies stood for and fought for. The explanation was highly abstract and philosophical, and the term “open society” never gained wide recognition. Nevertheless, Popper’s analysis was penetrating, and when I read it as a student in the late 1940s, having experienced at first hand both Nazi and Communist rule in Hungary, it struck me with the force of revelation.