The New Regionalism Approach

By Björn Hettne & Fredrik Söderbaum

Abstract

This introduction outlines the dramatically changed context and content of the renewed trend towards regionalism in the international system. We start by identifying some of the most relevant aspects of the latest wave, the ‘new regionalism’. The central concepts in the study of regionalism are both ambiguous and contested, and attempts are made at clarifying them. The concept of `regionness’ is central to the new regionalism approach (NRA), which is suggested as a broad, open-ended framework for analysing regionalisation in a multilevel and comparative perspective. Several specific theories and theoretical perspectives are needed for understanding the complexities of present-day regionalism, and a distinction is made here between regional and world approaches. Another distinction is that between monodisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches. Finally, the future of the new regionalism, the possibility of a regionalised world order, is touched upon.

 

Understanding Regionalism

To understand regionalism today it is essential to realise that we are dealing with a qualitatively new phenomenon. The ‘new regionalism’ refers to a phenomenon, still in the making, that began to emerge in the mid-1980s, in contrast to the `old regionalism’ that began in the 1950s and faded away in the 1970s. [1] Although studying the renewed trend towards regionalism sometimes involves a feeling of déjà vu, both the context and the content of regionalism have changed dramatically.

It is important to point out that the old regionalism must be understood within a particular historical context, dominated by the bipolar Cold War structure, while the current wave of regionalism needs to be related to the current transformation of the world. That is, the new regionalism is associated with or caused by a multitude of often interrelated structural transformations of the global system, the most important being:

·    the change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards a multipolar (or perhaps tripolar) structure, with a new international division of power (NIDP);[6]

·   the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more positive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism, at least in the form of `open regionalism’;

·   the restructuring of the global political economy into three major blocs: the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (Nafta) and the Asia-Pacific, which are all based on different forms of capitalism;

·   the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of economic, social and political interdependence and transnationalism, which has triggered new patterns of interaction both among governments and non-state actors;

·   the associated `globalisation’ of finance, trade, production and technology, which has led to a new international division of labour (NIDL);

·   recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral trading order hand in hand with the growing importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade; and

·   the end of `Third Worldism’ and changed attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic development and political system in the developing countries (cf Fawcett & Hurrell 1995; Gamble & Payne 1996; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1998; de Melo & Panagariya 1993; Stallings 1995).

The content of the renewed trend towards regionalism travelling the world today has also changed radically. New regionalism is a truly worldwide phenomenon that is taking place in more areas of the world than ever before. The old regionalism was generally specific about objectives and content, and often had a simple and narrow focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances, whereas the number, scope and diversity of the new regionalism has grown significantly during the last decade. New regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes. Convergence along these dimensions may be a natural process or politically steered or, most likely, a mixture of the two.

While the old regionalism was often imposed, directly or indirectly, from above and outside, very much in accordance with the bipolar Cold War power structure, so-called `hegemonic regionalism’, and/or as a simple copy of the European Communities (EC), the new regionalism involves more spontaneous processes that often emerge from below and within the region itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and problems.

Theories of European Integration

By Ľudmila Dolná

 

Introduction

The nascent European Communities offered the ideal empirical laboratory for verifying different theories and approaches. Theorists of European Integration used the vocabulary of the discipline of International Relations very often. I don’t want to evaluate the superficies of the European Union in order not to immerse in the critical evaluations of the common agricultural policy, or advantages and disadvantages of the accession of new countries to the EU.

I would like to remind that even in the practical world of European integration, theory couldn’t stay aside. Theory indicate perspective, is an integral part of human inquiry. Therefore, it recommends theoretical literacy as a fundamental prerequisite for the proper study of any aspect of the social world. Not everybody likes theorizing, but wittingly or unwittingly we must confess that theoretical perspectives inform our approach to the world that we observe.

Much can be written about European Integration in contemporary time. It is actually an autonomous field of study, often changing and updating. Why then we should speak about theories of European Integration, some of which already historically went out of use to be mentioned only in academic community? It is useful to provide at least particular projection on the various concepts of human thinking in this interesting historical process. Theories are probably the most capable to compound changing opinions and opposing ideas and therefore they can transmit message (heritage) to next generations. If we carefully go through the particular theories and not immediately take measures, rather study every one of them with respect, we have to acknowledge their value. Theories help us to participate better in various discussions about confrontation in miscellaneous areas of European policy. Subsequently we avoid simplified statements that so frequently occupy today’s world.

Theoretical works on European integration is obviously bound up with the unfolding story of the EU. Theorists tried to predict the development and answer all-important questions arisen in the first years of European integration in the heads of politicians.

The first theories, or so-called pre-theories of European integration as federalism, functionalism and transactionalism have something in common; they offer variations on a similar theme. All seek to theorize the conditions for the eradication of international conflict and all have been used as tools for the analysis of post-war Western Europe.

The Neofunctionalists Were (almost) Right: Politicization and European Integration

By Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks

 

Draft chapter for The Diversity of Democracy: A Tribute to Philippe C. Schmitter.  Please do not cite or quote. Comments welcome.

 

Introduction

In a recent paper, Philippe Schmitter laments that “no theory of regional integration has been as misunderstood, caricatured, pilloried, proven wrong and rejected as often as neofunctionalism” (2002:1). And he goes on to explicate, establish, embrace, and elaborate neofunctionalism in his inimitable way.

Almost fifty years of neofunctionalism have taught us a thing or two about regional integration. Neofunctionalism identifies basic building blocs for any valid theory of the subject, and more generally, for any valid theory of jurisdictional architecture.

Neofunctionalism argues that regional integration is shaped by its functional consequences—the pareto gains accruing to integration—but that functional needs alone cannot explain integration. Regional integration gives rise to potent political tensions. It shakes up relative capabilities, creates new inequalities, and transforms preferences. Above all, it leads to politicization, a general term for the process by which the political conflicts unleashed by integration come back to shape it. A decisive limitation of functionalism is that it does not engage the political consequences of its own potential success. What happens when the “objects” of regional integration—citizens and political parties—wake up and became its arbiters?

In this essay, we begin by taking a close look at how neofunctionalism and its precursor, functionalism, conceive the political context of regional integration. Then we turn to the experience of politicization over the past two decades and ask how it has shaped the level, scope, and character of European integration.

Regionalism in Comparative Perspective

By Peter J. Katzenstein (Cornell University)

 

The end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union have lessened the impact of global factors in world politics and have increased the weight of regional forces that had operated all along under the surface of superpower confrontation. International politics thus is increasingly shaped by regional, as well as national and local, dynamics. The peace process in the Middle East, for example, was fueled largely by regional pressures, not by the intervention of the United States, Russia or any other major power. The Russian project of reconstructing a sphere of influence in the “near abroad” of the Commonwealth of Independent States is driven by regional political factors. In Latin America a substantial decrease in political tensions and military expenditures has prepared the ground for sharp increases in regional economic cooperation. And in Europe, German unification was a decisive determinant for the simultaneous move towards a deepening and widening of the European integration process.

Asia is no exception to the growth of regional foces in world politics. Intra-Asian trade, a frequently used measure of regional integration, has increased greatly in the 1980s [Bergsten and Noland, eds. 1993. Frankel and Kahler, 1993a]. Furthermore, as the daily news illustrates regional political developments in Northeast and Southeast Asia are competing for our attention. Japan’s Prime Minister Murayama travelled through Southeast Asia in August 1994 hoping to deepen Japan’s economic ties in the region and allaying regional anxieties about Japanese and Asian security. Japan’s backing of South Korean trade minister Kim Chul Su as the “Asian” candidate, running against a “European” and a “North American” candidate, has helped make the selection of the first director general of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) an exercise in regional international politics. And Japan’s peak association of business, Keidanren, is reportedly considering endorsing the formation of a controversial all-Asian East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), first proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in 1990 [International Herald Tribune, 1994]. In the 1990s similar views have been expressed with increasing frequency by senior, well-placed individuals in Japan [Lincoln, 1992, p.19].

Will Asia tend towards openness or closure? Will it be dominated by Japan or shaped by multiple centers of influence? A neo-mercantilist perspective emphasizes that the world is moving towards relatively closed regional blocs. In this view Japan is at the brink of reestablishing a new version of the Co-prosperity sphere in Asia. The opposing, liberal view holds instead that global markets are creating convergent pressures across all national boundaries and regional divides.

Between regional blocs and global convergence this paper takes a middle position. Distinctive world regions are shaping national politics and policies. But these regions are indelibly linked to both the larger international system of which they are a part, and to the different national systems which constitute them. On balance the essays in this book highlight the factors that are creating an open form of Asian regionalism that is marked by multiple centers of influence.