The Negotiation Process and International Economic Organizations

By John S. Odell (School of International Relations University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043 odell@usc.edu)

 

Prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta Marriott Marquis and Atlanta Hilton and Towers, September 2-5, 1999.  Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

 

Abstract

We will understand the formation and dynamics of international organizations better if we invest in more and better research aimed at generalizing about the process of negotiation in those settings. The study of international institutions and the empirical study of negotiation have often been isolated from each other.  This has been changing, but many promising opportunities remain unexploited. This paper illustrates with reference to economic organizations. Research opportunities lie in questions such as what strategies regime negotiators use, what shapes their strategy choices, what effects these strategies have, what coalition-building tactics they use and which work best under what conditions, and how the process is conditioned by its contexts–domestic political institutions, cultures, the security environment, and the international organization context. One major reason for digging further into these possibilities is to benefit bargaining practice as well as the ivory towers.

 

Introduction

            We will understand the formation and dynamics of international organizations better if we invest in more and better research aimed at generalizing about the process of negotiation in those settings. The study of international institutions and the empirical study of negotiation have often been isolated from each other.  This has been changing, and we do have solid empirical knowledge about some regime negotiations, but many promising opportunities remain unexploited. This paper concentrates on economic organizations and illustrates possibilities for research, rather than reporting results of a completed project.[1]  One major reason for digging further into these possibilities is to benefit bargaining practice as well as the ivory towers.

            The negotiation process may be distinguished from the structures in which it takes place. Negotiation (or bargaining) is a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address demands and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one actor. Concretely, on international economic issues the process refers to what governments’ finance and trade ministers, for example, do with one another. The process includes which strategies negotiators choose, how markets and negotiators influence each other, whether negotiators add tactics to smoke out joint gains, how much they use tactics to guard against their own biases, and how they go about forming and splitting coalitions. The process includes how the negotiators’ moves interact with domestic politics.

            The outcome is a ratified government agreement or implicit settlement (or lack of agreement), rather than effects these official settlements may have later in politics or markets. The context consists of surrounding conditions that economic negotiators inherit and normally cannot influence much in the short term–cultures, international security conditions, domestic political institutions, and international organizations.

            Many fine studies of international institutions are dominated by theoretical interests other than the negotiation process.  Many revealing negotiation case studies have yet to be integrated under any common analytical framework. An increasing number of studies on institutional bargaining do give us promising foundations to build on.[2]  But rather than systematically reviewing the published literature here, I would prefer to cut to the chase and spell out some (I hope) provocative ideas for fresh studies, for discussion.

International Organizations Today: An Old Fashioned View From The Third World*

By B.S.Chimni

 

Introduction

1.International organizations (IOs) have today acquired a significance for third world states and peoples that they never possessed before. A network of economic, political and social IOs have been established or repositioned at the initiative of the First World that  together constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of the powerful states in the international system to the disadvantage of third world states and peoples[i]. The evolving global state formation may therefore be described as having a neo-imperial character.

2. Six overlapping features characterize contemporary developments relating to formal international inter-governmental organizations. First, in all areas of international life IOs have come into existence considerably limiting the autonomy of sovereign third world states. Second, sovereign economic decision making authority has been relocated from states to international economic organizations which possess effective enforcement powers. Third, the UN system is being geared to promote the interests of transnational capital, among other things by increasing the role that the private corporate sector can play within the organization(s). Fourth, the relationship between the state and the United Nations system is being explicitly reconstituted through reconfiguring the principle of sovereignty and its relationship to the protection of human rights. Fifth, the globalisation process is breaking the historical unity of the state and IOs. A whole range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have come to participate/influence in diverse ways in the norm creation and decision making process within IOs. While a large number of NGOs bring to IOs the critical voice of civil society, others (such as the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC) or the World Economic Forum (WEF)) seek to promote the cause of transnational capital[ii]. Even the critical voices often neglect the concerns of the third world (for example, by attempting to link trade with environment and labor standards) (Chimni 2002). Sixth, not only legitimacy deficit characterizes crucial IOs but is also  accompanied by strong resistance from powerful States to put in place a transparent and democratic decision making process. Together, these features limit the possibilities of global redistributive justice and the genuine democratization of both inter-state and intra-state relations. But a contrary impression is created by steering the knowledge production and dissemination functions of international institutions.

3. These features of IOs cannot be made sense of without locating them within the larger global social order, in particular the historical and political contexts in which they originate, evolve and function. Such an approach allows the insight that a coalition of powerful social classes and states decide when an IO is the appropriate form in which to pursue their interests, as also its central preoccupations (Murphy 1994: 25 and 44; Cox 1996). The class which exercises the most influence in IOs today is the transnational fractions of the national capitalist class in advanced capitalist countries with the now ascendant transnational fractions in the third world playing the role of junior partners[iii]. Together, the first and third world fractions of the world bourgeoisie constitute a transnational capitalist class (TCC)  which is in the process of congealing and establishing a global state constituted of diverse IOs –economic, political and social– that help actualize and legitimize its world view.

4. The TCC ‘is comprised of the owners of transnational capital, that is, the group that owns the leading worldwide means of production as embodied principally in the transnational corporations and private financial institutions’ (Robinson and Harris 2000: 22). However class is not to be viewed simply as a structural relation. It is also ‘a historical phenomenon’ and ‘ class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms’ (Thompson1975: 10). The TCC culture is lived and produced by a network of high profile corporate executives, bankers, brokers, financial management experts, media managers, academics and bureaucrats using the most modern means of communications to create a word of ideas that have material force. In the production of this culture the third world counterparts essentially act as ‘transmission belts and filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda (Robinson 1996: p.19), albeit there is the third world globalizing firm that also contributes to the original ensemble of practices (Sklair and Robbins 2002: 81).  In sum, the  demands of the TCC are articulated by, among others, states, business organizations and a network of TCC functionaries. It is a variegated and complex process with the states playing a crucial role in terms of ironing out differences through communicative action and presenting  proposals couched in acceptable language.  In other words, there is an internal process of giving expression to the demands of the TCC. Since some states are more powerful than others they have greater say in the actual formulation of demands of the TCC. What is more significant however is the overall consensus over the form of the emerging  global state.

The Two Faces of the United Nations: the Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism

By Bruce Cronin

 

Bruce Cronin is assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation (1999) and of several articles on sovereignty and on the changing norms of intervention. He is currently writing a book about how and why states protect foreign populations.

 

Introduction

There is a tension within the United Nations between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism, two forces that encompass different sets of interests and reflect distinct constituencies. As an intergovernmental institution, the UN reflects the overlapping interests of its member states, particularly those on the Security Council. Major initiatives and policies are promoted by accredited delegations, all of whom represent their governments. As a transnational organization, however, the UN also often represents a common good that transcends the sum of individual state interests. Such concerns are promoted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and by the UN’s specialized agencies, affiliated organizations, bureaucracy, and office of the secretarygeneral. In many cases, transnational concerns such as human rights or humanitarian relief conflict with the more traditional intergovernmental ones such as security. When this occurs, the UN is unable to function effectively.

This conflict between intergovernmentalism and transnationalism reflects a similar tension within the international system itself. Intergovernmentalism is certainly the dominant force in world politics, but transnational actors have also achieved increased visibility and influence within the global organization. From this perspective, the UN not only provides a forum for states to resolve their disputes, it also serves as a medium through which state and nonstate actors promote their often competing interests. Thus, the conflict between these forces within the UN can help to illustrate their respective roles in international politics.

In this article I examine this tension and explore what this may mean for the future of global politics. Since this is primarily a conceptual essay, I do not present original data nor examine specific cases in any detail. Rather my purpose is to identify and explain a phenomenon and provide a framework through which one can undertake empirical studies in the future.

In the first section I examine the intergovernmental and transnational foundations of the UN system. I argue that while traditional theories of international organizations can explain the intergovernmental side of the UN, they have trouble accounting for the transnational aspects. In the next section I try to account for this other face of the UN by suggesting that the UN is not only a forum for interstate cooperation, but also an institutional embodiment of an “international community,” independent of the states that compose it. The benefits that are enjoyed by this broadly defined community can be viewed as the common good. In the third section I examine the inherent tension between these two forces. I argue that when the interests of the states conflict with those of the broader community, the organization becomes paralyzed. In the last section I discuss the broader implications of the conflict for theories of international relations.

In distinguishing between intergovernmental and transnational functions, I use the following criteria: First, which constituency is being served in a particular operation or program: the member states, local populations, nongovernmental interest groups, the “international community” as a whole, or regional organizations? I define those programs that serve primarily nonstate actors as transnational. Second, who are the primary actors initiating the operation or program: the member states, specialists within the UN agencies, government representatives to functional bodies, NGOs, or the UN Secretariat? Those activities that require the active cooperation and participation of the states are intergovernmental. Those that rely primarily on UN agencies, NGOs, specialized agencies, or the Secretariat are considered transnational. Third, through what process are state interests defined in a particular issue: domestically, through consultation with representatives from other countries, through interaction among special ists or representatives of NGOs, or by initiation of the secretary-general? Interests that develop through diplomatic or domestic political channels are intergovernmental, while those that evolve from within the UN structure are transnational.