Nobody Here But Us Liberals: Competing Liberal Theories of International Relations and the International Relations of Ethnic Conflict

By Stephen M. Saideman and  Young Choul-Kim (Texas Tech University)

 

Abstract

            The democratic peace debate has taken a new turn, focusing on a debate among liberal theorists about what drives foreign policy: domestic structures, democratic norms, economic interests, international norms and institutions, or domestically derived preferences.  This article takes this debate to a different realm—from that of interstate war to taking sides in ethnic conflicts in other countries.  As the various liberal strands are more likely to have competing predictions in this second area, we should not only see clearer some of the logical contradictions between different liberal approaches but also determine whether certain liberal arguments better capture what states actually do.  The article derives testable hypotheses from several strands of liberal thought and applies them to a dyadic dataset of ethnic groups and states to see what relationships exist.  We find that ethnic ties, which is how we conceive of preferences here, shapes the behavior of states towards ethnic groups in other countries more than domestic structures.  Other liberal arguments, such as common interests (states facing separatism do not support separatist groups), economic interests, and democratic norms either do not matter that much or have an effect opposite from what liberals would usually argue.  We conclude by focusing on liberalism as a preference-centered approach.

 

Acknowledgements

First, a grant from Texas Tech University’s Research Enhancement Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York made the creation of this dataset possible.  Of course, the statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author, and not of the Carnegie Corporation.  Second, I owe a dept to Ted Gurr, Anne Pitsch, Deepa Khosa and the rest of the Minorities at Risk project for providing me with their dataset and raw data, and for helping me in using it.  Third, I am grateful to Douglas Van Belle, as he helped me develop my indicators for relative power.  Likewise, James Fearon provided crucial assistance in suggesting how to use code language differentials, although his advice related to a different project.   Finally, I am very thankful for the research assistance provided by Cari MacDonald and J.W. Justice.

 

Introduction

            The democratic peace debate has followed an interesting trajectory.  At first, scholars sought to show that a correlation existed between democracy and peace (Chan 1984; Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993).  Since then, adherents and critics have engaged in lively discussions about whether significant relationships exist and what might be causing these relationships.[1]  Now, the debate has evolved to the point where liberal theorists are arguing with each other about the causes of this phenomena.[2]  Eric Gartzke (1998, 2000) has argued that common interests have caused democracies not to fight with each other.  Bruce Russett and John Oneal (1997, 1999) have strongly disagreed, arguing that democratic institutions, international organizations, and economic interdependence have bound democracies together, creating a zone of peace among them.  They both might be right, but their differences raise questions about liberal international relations theory.

As liberal theory develops as a paradigm for understanding international relations, it makes sense to work out the conflicting claims that flow from core liberal assumptions and deductions.  The problem with using the democratic peace as the battleground for various liberal arguments is that they largely predict the same outcome, so scholars have to argue about which factors have more causal weight.[3]  Focusing on where liberal theories produce conflicting expectations should provide clearer understandings of the insights and limitations provided by the different approaches.  This article applies several strands of liberal thought to the international politics of ethnic conflict to determine which ones provide better accounts not only of this particular issue, but of foreign policy in general. 

International Relations: One World, Many Theories

By Stephen M. Walt

 

Source: Foreign Policy. Washington: Spring 1998., Iss. 110;  pg. 29, 16 pgs

 

Introduction

Why should policymakers and practitioners care about the scholarly study of international affairs? Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptuous of “theory” must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one’s basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories-whether he or she knows it or not-and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes.

Take, for example, the current debate on how to respond to China. From one perspective, China’s ascent is the latest example of the tendency for rising powers to alter the global balance of power in potentially dangerous ways, especially as their growing influence makes them more ambitious. From another perspective, the key to China’s future conduct is whether its behavior will be modified by its integration into world markets and by the (inevitable?) spread of democratic principles. From yet another viewpoint, relations between China and the rest of the world will be shaped by issues of culture and identity: Will China see itself (and be seen by others) as a normal member of the world community or a singular society that deserves special treatment?

In the same way, the debate over NATO expansion looks different depending on which theory one employs. From a “realist” perspective, NATO expansion is an effort to extend Western influence-well beyond the traditional sphere of U.S. vital interests-during a period of Russian weakness and is likely to provoke a harsh response from Moscow From a liberal perspective, however, expansion will reinforce the nascent democracies of Central Europe and extend NATO’S conflictmanagement mechanisms to a potentially turbulent region. A third view might stress the value of incorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland within the Western security community, whose members share a common identity that has made war largely unthinkable.

No single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. Although we should take care to emphasize inventiveness over invective, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.

 

Where are we Coming From?

The study of international affairs is best understood as a protracted competition between the realist, liberal, and radical traditions. Realism emphasizes the enduring propensity for conflict between states; liberalism identifies several ways to mitigate these conflictive tendencies; and the radical tradition describes how the entire system of state relations might be transformed. The boundaries between these traditions are somewhat fuzzy and a number of important works do not fit neatly into any of them, but debates within and among them have largely defined the discipline.

LEIBNIZ’S REVENGE: International Relations Between Realism & Idealism… again?

By Marcos Farias Ferreira

 

Introduction

How should we reflect upon the nature and substance of International Relations? Are there any foundations, Archimedean points, or anchorages, we can take hold of to guide us through that route? Are we sentenced to engage in it, recurrently, from the vantage point of a resolute and insurmountable crisis? In fact, ‘crisis’ seems to be the word most utilised by contemporary thinkers of matters international to represent the current state of affairs in the discipline. It is most revealing that in editing their book on International Relations in the period 1919-1999, Tim Dunne, Michael Cox and Ken Booth have given it the suggestive title: The Eighty Years’ Crisis. In the introduction, they explain the motives for drawing on the title of E. H. Carr’s best-known book and the sense in which the word ‘crisis’ is again helpful to locate us within International Relations. “Sixty years on”, they write, “another sense of crisis pervades the discipline.”[1] The parallel with Carr’s times was pushed even further to acknowledge the uncertainty of thinking about world politics which is alike and the location of uncertainty and crisis in a cognate process of intellectual transformation. The perspective endorsed here does not merely take into account that this sense of uncertainty comes from the difficulty of coping with a ‘turbulent world’; it brings also into discussion the increasing disposition of some intellectual quarters to question the epistemological foundations of a world (we thought) we used to know.

            Making his own trip back to E. H. Carr on this matter, Fred Halliday has peremptorily asserted: “[n]o crisis, no academic discipline.”[2] This he advanced on the conference held to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the department of International Politics in the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, stressing the direct relationship between the emergence of distinct academic disciplines and the sense of crisis in modern society. Therefore, looking at International Relations from the vantage point of an eighty years’ crisis seems to suggest that we take on a perspective of the discipline that associates ‘crisis’ with ‘uncertainty’ and further with ‘transformation’. A discipline pervaded with a deep sense of crisis is definitely a discipline on the brink of transformation.

There is something more though for which this sense of crisis permeating the discipline can be accountable. ‘No crisis, no academic discipline’, Fred Halliday asserted on that special occasion. Nevertheless, what the sense of crisis has also brought about to the academic discipline of International Relations was a renewed interest and enquiry into its very identity and trajectory. Trapped in, or inspired by, a fin-de-siècle malaise, some of those concerned with the discipline have outlined the necessity of engaging in archaeological and genealogical labours in order to investigate and recapitulate the themes that have structured what can be designated the discourse of International Relations. By using as his starting point Michel Foucault’s writings on the archaeology and genealogy of knowledge, Steve Smith has often focused his attention on the “stories international theory has told about itself.”[3] Consequently, his central concern turns to how international theory has been described and categorised and how specific descriptions and categories have become commonplace.

Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics

by Gustaaf Geeraerts

 

Introduction

One of the most prominent features of the global political system in the second half of the twentieth century is the significant surge in numbers and importance of non-state entities. With the growth of interdependence and communication between societies, a great variety of new organizational structures, operating on a regional and global basis, have been established. The rise of these transnationally organized non-state actors and their growing involvement in world politics challenge the assumptions of traditional approaches to international relations which assume that states are the only important units of the international system. While some authors recognize that these non-sovereign entities and their activities have led to fundamental changes in world politics, others maintain that the structure of the international system can still be treated on the basis of inter-state relations.

A first aim of this paper is to analyze how the main paradigms in the field of international relations approach actors in world politics. Scholars debate whether non-state entities should be treated as distinct and autonomous actors or merely as instruments of states. If we look at the latest theoretical developments in the field, however, there seems to be a definite movement toward a mixed-actor perspective, viz. a view of the international system based on the coexistence of states and non-state actors.

A second aim is to develop a new typology of non-state actors. In doing so we hope to offer a way out of the confusion which reigns supreme in past efforts at classification of the actors under consideration. Scholars argue over how to catalogue and define the variety of new organizational structures that have emerged. The definition of a transnational organization, in particular, is approached in a number of different ways. After reviewing the major typologies of non-state actors that have been proposed in the literature, we develop a scheme for classifying non-state actors which is more in line with recent developments and offers the ability to encompass some of the more complex organizations that are neither purely governmental nor purely private in nature.