Archive for the ‘Methodology’ Category

Positivism & Post-Positivism

February 18, 2009

By William M.K. Trochim

 

Let’s start our very brief discussion of philosophy of science with a simple distinction between epistemology and methodology. The term epistemology comes from the Greek word epistêmê, their term for knowledge. In simple terms, epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge or of how we come to know. Methodology is also concerned with how we come to know, but is much more practical in nature. Methodology is focused on the specific ways — the methods — that we can use to try to understand our world better. Epistemology and methodology are intimately related: the former involves the philosophy of how we come to know the world and the latter involves the practice.

When most people in our society think about science, they think about some guy in a white lab coat working at a lab bench mixing up chemicals. They think of science as boring, cut-and-dry, and they think of the scientist as narrow-minded and esoteric (the ultimate nerd — think of the humorous but nonetheless mad scientist in the Back to the Future movies, for instance). A lot of our stereotypes about science come from a period where science was dominated by a particular philosophy — positivism — that tended to support some of these views. Here, I want to suggest (no matter what the movie industry may think) that science has moved on in its thinking into an era of post-positivism where many of those stereotypes of the scientist no longer hold up.

Let’s begin by considering what positivism is. In its broadest sense, positivism is a rejection of metaphysics (I leave it you to look up that term if you’re not familiar with it). It is a position that holds that the goal of knowledge is simply to describe the phenomena that we experience. The purpose of science is simply to stick to what we can observe and measure. Knowledge of anything beyond that, a positivist would hold, is impossible. When I think of positivism (and the related philosophy of logical positivism) I think of the behaviorists in mid-20th Century psychology. These were the mythical ‘rat runners’ who believed that psychology could only study what could be directly observed and measured. Since we can’t directly observe emotions, thoughts, etc. (although we may be able to measure some of the physical and physiological accompaniments), these were not legitimate topics for a scientific psychology. B.F. Skinner argued that psychology needed to concentrate only on the positive and negative reinforcers of behavior in order to predict how people will behave — everything else in between (like what the person is thinking) is irrelevant because it can’t be measured.

In a positivist view of the world, science was seen as the way to get at truth, to understand the world well enough so that we might predict and control it. The world and the universe were deterministic — they operated by laws of cause and effect that we could discern if we applied the unique approach of the scientific method. Science was largely a mechanistic or mechanical affair. We use deductive reasoning to postulate theories that we can test. Based on the results of our studies, we may learn that our theory doesn’t fit the facts well and so we need to revise our theory to better predict reality. The positivist believed in empiricism — the idea that observation and measurement was the core of the scientific endeavor. The key approach of the scientific method is the experiment, the attempt to discern natural laws through direct manipulation and observation. (more…)

Dadaism and the Peace Differend

November 11, 2008

by Oliver P. Richmond

 

Abstract

This experimental essay attempts to show how alternative methods and approaches are valuable in interrogating the ways in which orthodox theories of international relations (IR) approach peace. Drawing on a broad variety of critical traditions, it seeks to encourage the development of creative and experimental interdisciplinary approaches as well as to underline the deficiencies of more instrumentalist theories and methods. It especially tries to show how eclectic and experimental theories and methods produce sophisticated insights that are capable of reorienting analysis so as to respond to dynamics that must be understood if sustainable and multiple variations of peace are to emerge.

 

Keywords: Dadaism, peace, differend, international relations, experimental eclecticism

  
Introduction
The life we led, our follies and our deeds of heroism, our
  provocations, however "polemical" and aggressive they may have been,
  were all part of a tireless quest for an anti-art, a new way of
  thinking, feeling, and knowing.--Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-
  Art (1)

Is IR theory antipeace? Certainly, for a long period any notion of peace has been submerged behind the debates about states, sovereignty, institutions, norms, identity, and representation. (2) On the institutionalization of this discipline after World War I it was hoped it would help discover a postwar peace dividend, especially through idealist and, later, liberal approaches. Whether this occurred is debatable. Certainly, orthodox analyses of international relations have failed in this respect, although they have been instrumental in developing a liberal discourse of peace since 1945, albeit one that has been as an expression of Western interests, rationalism, and culture. Even peace research has been criticized for having the potential to become “a council of imperialism,” further implicating the discipline in the “tragedy” of international relations. (3)

This tendency is indicative of a “differend,” a reminder that institutions and frameworks may produce injustices even when operating in good faith. (4) Many researchers interested in this problem often blame the “muscular objectivism” (5) that has dominated the analysis of international relations in Western scholarship and policy. This has resulted in a narrow discipline, prone to lose sight of a broadly emancipatory notion of peace and insulating it from the contemporary culture wars that are raging across many other disciplines. The survival of the demand for reductionism and parsimony through “research” in liberal institutions without need for a broader ethical exploration is of especially great concern, given that methodological pluralism has become a generally accepted objective across many disciplines as a way of avoiding parochialism. (6) As with premodernist art, orthodox analyses of international relations represent the world mimetically, so that repetitions of the lessons of history become a self-fulfilling prophecy. (7) In order to gain a multidimensional understanding of international relations, this article argues, it will be necessary to embrace an ironic eclecticism in the manner of the Dadaists and of many other antimimetic approaches to representation that recognize universal subjectivity, rather than trying to replicate an eternal truth or reality. (8) (more…)

On causality and Generalization in International Relations: Critical Realist Answers to the Positivist Dilemmas of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods

September 22, 2008

By Mehmet Y. Tezcan

 

Introduction

A confrontational dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research methods in International Relations[1] (IR) came into existence in 1960s. Until the first import of the quantitative methods to the discipline in late 1950s (cf. Knorr and Rosenau 1969: 5; Smith 1996: 32-33; Nicholson 1996b: 135; Wight 2002: 28), qualitative methods remained for quite a while as the only option in the study of international relations. The spread and domination of the quantitative methods in 1960s came so rapidly that even those behavioralist IR scholars were themselves taken by surprise.[2] Quantitative methods rose to hegemonic position in terms of methodology not only spectacularly, but also discriminatingly. Since qualitative methods could not qualify as ‘scientific enough’ according to the champions of behavioralist IR who were committed to the thesis of ‘unity of science’ in strict sense, condemnation of the former to marginalization gradually replaced uneasy coexistence of two methods. Mutual exclusion of and thesis of incommensurability with the ‘other’ method have prevailed for the next three decades. (more…)

The Role of the Congruence Method for Case Study Research

September 12, 2008

By Alexander L. George



Before describing and illustrating the congruence method in case study research we will place it in the broader context of discussions of the comparative method and, in particular, the method of controlled comparison. We employ the term “comparative method” in one of its customary usages as referring to comparative analysis of a relatively small number of cases by non-statistical means. “Controlled comparison,” more specifically, refers to the method of studying two or more cases that resemble each other in every respect but one, thereby achieving or approximating the functional equivalent of an experiment which makes it possible to rely on experimental logic to draw causal inferences.

We shall discuss first the requirements for controlled comparison and emphasize the difficulty of meeting them. Our purpose in doing so is to point up the need to develop an alternative method for case study research that does not rely upon experimental logic. We believe it is urgent to develop such an alternative to the experimental paradigm because it is generally extremely difficult to find two cases that resemble each other in every respect but one. Not only is the possibility of establishing the control required for an experiment obviously out of the question for most questions that need to be researched in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, the familiar alternative of using statistical analysis to achieve the functional equivalent of an experiment runs into the fact that there is an insufficient number of cases for many problems that require study. Further, even in those cases in which experimentation is possible it is often regarded as ethically problematic and discouraged, if not forbidden. (more…)