Catastrophic Terrorism and the International System

by Stephen E. Sachs (International Relations, Merton College, Oxford Week 8, Michaelmas Term 2003)

 

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, demonstrated the need for a complete reassessment of the existing threats to international security. Writing shortly after Sept. 11, Seyla Benhabib suggested two “unprecedented aspects of our current condition”: first, “the emergence of non-state agents capable of waging destruction at a level hitherto thought to be only the province of states,” and second, “the emergence of a supranational ideological vision with an undefinable moral and political content, which can hardly be satisfied by ordinary political tactics and negotiations.”[1] To which one could perhaps add a third: the growing potential for catastrophic violence to be inflicted instantaneously in the course of a single operation, such as through the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The combination of these three factors poses a new kind of security threat to nations such as the United States, one perhaps more severe than any to which those nations are accustomed. Yet the possibility of catastrophic terrorism also threatens the nature of the international order, giving states which are the targets of terrorism strong incentives to act outside current norms of the international system. Proposals to address terrorism through globally accepted means, such as a strengthened international law-enforcement framework or aid targeted to the “root causes” of terror, are either unlikely to succeed in the short term or unlikely to be accepted by states under threat. As a result, the potential for unilateral military action in contravention of previous norms on the use of force has greatly increased. Unless the international community is willing to revise those norms to give greater latitude to counterterrorist efforts, one can expect greater frictions within the international community to be a further consequence of the new kind of terrorism.

The change in the requirements of international security has its source in a change in the nature of terrorism. As Benhabib noted, the most striking change is the growth in power of non-state actors, some of whom (such as al Qaeda) represent transnational networks devoted to terrorism. Although the United States, Louise Richardson argues, “generally perceives international terrorism as deliberately directed by governments,” much modern terrorism is the work of actors who are not under the direct control of any state.[2] Financial or logistical support for a group may purchase influence, but not control over its activities; by analogy, U.S. aid to Israel did not give it complete control over Israeli foreign policy, nor did the Afghan mujehadeen feel compelled to support U.S. initiatives after the Soviets had left. Cases of direct government control of terrorist organizations are relatively rare, and it is more common for groups to receive training, funds, and safe haven from a variety of different governments at once (often specifically to avoid such relationships of dependence.)[3] Though such patrons of terrorism may bear moral responsibility for the actions of their clients, Richardson argues, they are not responsible in any direct sense, and may not have had prior knowledge of an attack even if they welcome it.[4]

More concerningly, terrorist networks are emerging which operate almost entirely on “private” funding and organization. The al Qaeda network relies on modern communications technology to coordinate a vast array of non-hierarchical cells, setting its own agenda and raising its own funds. Osama bin Laden, for example, possesses a vast personal fortune and has been reported to own or control some 80 companies worldwide, including much of the economic production of the Sudan.[5] Ian Lesser notes that terrorist groups have increasingly sought to raise funds through criminal activity, such as the drug trade; links between transnational terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations, especially given the “enormous sums of money involved,” can “facilitate acts that would be difficult for politically motivated terrorist groups to undertake–and pay for–on their own.”[6] Al Qaeda’s sophisticated organization and independent funding has enabled it to act as a significant player on an international scene previously dominated by sovereign states.

The Global Ideology of Fear

By Tariq Ramadan

 

In New Perspective Quarterly (NPQ), Vol 23 No 1, Winter 2006

 

When we examine the countries of the West or those of the South, particularly where the population is primarily Muslim, we can only conclude that fear is omnipresent and deeply ingrained. It is having an unmistakable impact on the way human beings perceive the world. We can observe at street level three principal effects:

First, fear, naturally and often unconsciously, breeds mistrust and potential conflict with the “Other.” A binary vision of reality begins to impose the outlines of a protective “us” and of a threatening “them.”

The second effect derives from the absolute domination of emotions in our relationships with the Other and of emotional responses to events. When fear rules, emotions undermine rational analysis. In such a state, we condemn the consequences of some action and reject the individuals who commit it, but we don’t seek to understand what led to such action.

Our “good reasons” and our “just causes” are praised by the general public without critical examination, while at the same time their “bad reasons” and their “evil intentions” are indiscriminately condemned. Fear authorizes us to forgo all explanations, all understanding, all analysis that might allow us to understand the Other, his world, his hopes.

In the new regime of fear and suspicion, to understand the Other is to justify him; to seek out his reasons is to agree with him. A curious—and dangerous—reductionism transforms reality into a series of discreet, disconnected facts, and the Other into a series of acts without cause, without history or historic depth, without reason and rationality. Emotion does not understand but rather appreciates or condemns; one’s “feelings” determine everything.

The third consequence is as paradoxical as it is startling: We may well live in the communication age, but human beings seem to be increasingly less informed. We have witnessed the multiplication of “communication superhighways” that diffuse a dizzying excess of information in real time, saturating the intelligence and making it impossible to place facts in perspective. The communication age is an age of non-information. We are passive receptors of reality and of facts; it is as if we have no grasp on how they come to be. Swept away by our emotions; trapped in binary, reductive logical structures; and lost in the rising tide of “as it happens” events and politics, it has become impossible for us to see, to understand or even to hear the Other.

Terrorism: When Risk Meets Security

By Karen Lund Petersen

 

Paper presented at the conference “9/11 Five Years After: Values, Risks and Identity in the War on Terror“, held in Oslo 11-12 September 2006 and organised by COST Action A24.

 

Introduction

Throughout history private companies have been considered important to national security. In the heydays of mercantilism protectionism was seen as an important foreign policy instrument and in recent times, boycotts of products and stops for export have been used as a strategy in international politics. With the events of 9-11 private companies have, however, come to play a far more active role in defining western security policies. Considering, the diversity of threats coming from terrorism (military threats, biological infections, killings, kidnappings etc), the U.S. Federal government no longer consider private companies as passive performers but companies are directly asked to take active part in defining the national security policy. As it has been repeatedly emphasized by President George Bush, a shared responsibility between government and private sector is essential to national security in the face of a terrorist threat. (Bush 2002: 24; Bush 2003a and b)

By threatening private companies, terrorism hits the western images of market and capital and the individuals right to freedom of movement (so fundamental to the existence of the ‘market’). This metaphorical relation between the company and the vulnerability of the liberal state is very important politically; because it describes some very fundamental values of our society and because it is these values that groups such as Al-Qaida tries to fight. In order to reduce the vulnerability many regulatory initiatives have been taken to increase corporate security: increasing the control of imported food products; increasing the control and security in airports; and far-reaching regulation of the private insurance market, to mention just a few initiatives.

National security has, however, also become an integrated concern in the decision-making of many private companies. In corporate circles there has been a heated debate on how to manage the threat from terrorism and relate to the increasing political and public concerns with corporate security. In 2005, the World Economic Forum stated that the risk of terrorism is likely to have an ‘extreme impact’ on business and markets in the future. This awareness has led many companies to include terrorism in their risk assessments and the insurance industry to invest much effort in developing methods for determining the risk levels of terrorism.

Civilizational States, Secularisms and Religions

By Peter J. Katzenstein (pjk2@cornell.edu)

 

Paper prepared for the Meeting of the Working Group on Religion, Secularism and International Affairs, Social Science Research Council, New York, May 11-12, 2007 and presented at Columbia University January 23, 2008

 

Introduction

This paper cuts against the grain of much writing on international relations. It does not start with the assumption that, by privatizing religion, the Peace of Westphalia left international politics fully secular.  Furthermore, it does not assume that secularism should be conceived of in the singular. Secularism in international relations is central to substantively different arguments about international relations – realist power politics, liberal cosmopolitanism, and Marxist class struggle. All three view religious conflicts as relics of a bygone era, a sideshow to the struggle over primacy, the coordination of conflicting objectives, and the dynamics of class conflict. There is something appealing and implausible about this view. Appealing is the search for simplification and a parsimonious understanding of international politics. Implausible are the denial of the continued relevance of religion for world politics and a view of secularism in the singular despite the fact that many aspects of secular politics – state, capitalism and democracy –  are so variegated empirically.